







THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR

Facts and Documents

BY

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"DANTE AND HIS TIME," "HISTORY OF CARDINAL MAZARIN,"

"ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LITERATURE,"

ETC.



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I. INTRODUCTORY WORDS

These pages have not been written to gratify the passions of nationalism of any kind or to indulge in hatred of hostile countries and nations. I believe that if the peoples of civilized countries had correct notions of each other's real disposition and were not misled by interested persons, this fearful war might never have been precipitated. And I fear that an increase of hatred between the civilized nations of the earth will be its most deplorable result.

I have lived in England and France, and have in both these countries very real sympathies. French history and French literature have been the chief subject of my studies and publications for many years, as my readers know: I cannot but love the country and the nation whose spirit has attracted me so far as to make me give my

chief attention to its development. And I am deeply indebted to French scholars for the kind assistance given by them to my work. I have been a member of the Comité for the Rapprochement Intellectuel Franco-Allemand; and as for England, I wrote articles during the Boer war to defend the British point of view, when I was almost alone in my nation to do so. I have for a long time considered English civilization as foremost and the English constitution as a model. I have constantly been pleading for an understanding between Germany and France and England as the most advanced nations of Europe. I do not believe in Lord Palmerston's maxim, "Right or wrong, my country"; on the contrary, I do believe it to be a most pernicious principle. I trust I may be able to discuss the present situation with calmness and impartiality.

From an international viewpoint I have attempted to scrutinize as briefly as possible the

facts which led to the war. These facts cover a much larger field than those contained in the multicolored books, particularly the German White Book and the British White Papers, the documents most generally known.

II. WAR-PREPARATIONS

On the very last day on which postal intercourse between France and Germany seemed possible, I wrote to a dear friend in Paris who is now doing his duty as an officer in the French army, the following words:

“These are days of horrible suspense. The attitude of the Government as well as that of the public here in Berlin is admirable, very quiet and very resolute; if it is to be war, they will fight with a fury which will be the more terrible, for the very reason that they do not desire to fight! Do not believe what your papers tell you; I live here and I see: Neither the emperor, nor the Government, nor the people want war; it is Russia who forces them by threatening Austria, their ally. And if the war is to be, Germany will win, do not doubt that; but my heart is op-

pressed by the thought of what a new defeat will mean for France. France will pay for the crime of her statesmen who have made the shameful alliance with Russia, an alliance contradictory to all that is really great and glorious in French history."

I am still convinced that in writing these words I have chanced upon the wound of which Europe is now bleeding.

The league of England and France with Russia, the league of the two most advanced, the two most western states of Europe, with the oriental empire whose spirit is directly opposed to theirs, is the most astonishing political factor in this war. Surely, powerful political reasons must have induced Western statesmen to forget such an antagonism; considerations of great weight must have covered the abyss which separated the lands of freedom and democracy from the despotic state where hanging, torturing,

and political exile are the means of government.

Was it a moral or let us rather say a compelling political reason, the true interest of their country, which moved French statesmen to conclude that famous alliance so often deplored by Frenchmen of mark? Or was it the old desire for "Revanche" for Sedan that made the Republican Government give Russian despotism some twenty billions to continue its rule of oppression over the Poles, Finlanders, Jews, Ruthenians, and the other subjugated races? Without such assistance the political freedom of the Russian people themselves would have made rapid strides.¹ Was it all in the interest of assuring the peace of Europe—for this was the official formula of the alliance—that in these last years loans were furnished for the special

¹ See Prince Kropotkin's pamphlet, "The White Terror," and the speech on "The Horrors of Russian Prisons," made by the late François de Pressensé, on February 13, 1913, in the "Hôtel des Sociétés Savantes" in Paris.

purpose of building strategic railways on the Austrian border? Was it all disinterested patriotism, when the French Boulevard Press wrote on behalf of Russia and inflamed the French mind against Germany, systematically reviving that thirst for revenge which was beginning to fade in the new generation? It is an open secret that this campaign was headed with particular vigour by the "Matin" after its director's journey to Russia about two years ago, and that the "Temps," seeing the growing influence of the "Matin," attempted to vie with its rival.

England, on the other hand, was actuated by the desire to secure the so-called balance of power in Europe, and seeing Germany's rapid growth, tried and succeeded in reconciling France after the "affront" of Fashoda and in making the "Entente Cordiale" with that Power.

France and England, however, had been friends and allies before. It was a much bigger

change in England's foreign politics when it became the friend of its old formidable opponent in Europe and Asia. How often has war seemed imminent between Russia and England since the English fleet appeared in the Ægean in 1878, down to 1904, when England's Japanese ally defeated the Russians in Manchuria, and Russian warships shot at British boats in the North Sea!

The clever monarch, the shrewd politician who caused English politics to veer around to such an extent was King Edward VII. After the period of England's "splendid isolation" he originated a policy if not exactly of alliances yet one of "ententes" and succeeded in forming what Sir Edward Grey chose to call "not an alliance but a diplomatic group"; though the "Entente" of this "diplomatic group," as everybody is now able to ascertain, has proved more binding and effective than other alliances.

Was it Germany who threatened the world's

peace and made this powerful league necessary in order to preserve it? It is true that since her wonderful resurrection from division and decay—an incredible and incomparable resurrection after the country's having been divided in itself and powerless for ages, the toy of foreign influences, the battle-field of foreign ambitions,—it is true, I say, that since the reconstruction of the Empire in 1871, Germany has constantly risen in power, commerce, industry,—it is true that she has built a great fleet and has gone on organizing a great army. Yet with all her power, with an army which though far from being the biggest, may perhaps be considered the best of the world, with an ever-growing fleet, she has preserved peace for full forty-three years, though occasions for making war on one of her neighbours were not wanting.

I ask any man who knows history: Is there in the history of Europe the case of a nation which,

after three victorious wars, with an ever-growing population and an ever better organized military force, did nevertheless keep peace for full forty-three years? When did France remain peaceful under such conditions? She waged war after war whenever she had the power to do so. And Russia? And England? How many wars, conquests, expeditions in all parts of the world in the same period!

The German colonies were all gained by amicable arrangement, as far as civilized nations are concerned, while those of other countries have been almost all conquered by the sword. Even America has obtained possession of the Philippines by conquest.

Occasions, as I said, were not wanting. If Germany considered Russia's power dangerous, what an opportunity for crushing it in 1904, during the Japanese war, when England was bound to assist Japan! If she thought England her rival,

what an occasion during the Boer War, when England was hated all around and by no nation more fiercely than by the French!

And yet there are men who dare say that Germany, who gave such an example of peacefulness, an example unparalleled in history, threatened the other nations.

But, they say, Germany was a threat by her very existence! And there is a hidden truth in their saying so; though this truth is quite the contrary of that which they intend to convey. The truth is, they chose to consider Germany's existence a threat because they disliked her growing power, her commerce, her riches, her influence, the successful competition of her manufactures, her merchants, her ships throughout the world. They saw indeed a threat in all this. But what else does such a feeling imply, what else the numerous expressions of dislike and fear, but that they would have liked to threaten Ger-

many and, waiting for the favorable moment, continued to prepare the world for their plans by crying out: "See how Germany threatens us!"

But Germany constantly increased her army and her fleet! you may say. Has not Russia always had an army greater than the German forces? Has not France devised an immense army of white, black and brown men, and not civilized blacks and browns, as known in the States, but from aboriginal savages? Has not England constantly increased her own fleet? and the other states as well?¹

You may perhaps answer: It is true, but they were forced to do so because of Germany's con-

¹ That the German fleet whose constant increase was a special reproach made to Germany by English writers, was too small, has been proved in the present war by its being unable to protect Germany's commerce and her colonies. And surely it will be conceded as a just demand that a nation whose commercial fleet is the second in the world, has the right, as well as the duty, to build a fleet sufficient to protect it. Germany never raised the exorbitant claim that her navy—or for that, neither her army—had to be the biggest in the world as England did.

stant and powerful preparations and her alliances. But, Germany and Austria and Italy together—had *from the very beginning fewer men, a smaller army, and a much smaller fleet than the Triple Entente*.—Besides, the two Empires could count upon Italy only in some very particular cases; and English statesmen knew this very well.¹

The forces of the European armies in March, 1914, were (according to Capt. Rottmann):

	Number of men on peace footing	Army plus number of men in trained reserve
German Army.....	781,000	4,000,000
Austro-Hungarian	<u>414,000</u>	¹ <u>3,720,000</u>
Armies of Germany and Aus- tria-Hungary	1,195,000	7,720,000
French Army	900,000	4,600,000
English Army	258,000	730,000
Russian Army	<u>1,850,000</u>	<u>7,400,000</u>
Armies of the Triple- Entente	3,008,000	War- force 12,730,000

¹ Including "Landsturm."

¹ In the "Nineteenth Century and After" of July, 1911, Sir William H. White, late Director of Naval Construction, in an article entitled "The Naval Outlook," stated his "belief that the

This shows clearly that, in March, 1914, the armies of the Triple-Entente on peace-footing outnumbered those of Germany and Austria-Hungary by nearly 2,000,000; while the war-force of the Triple-Entente outnumbered that of Germany and Austria-Hungary by no less than 5,000,000!!

The most striking fact to be deduced from these figures is that the peace-force of the Triple-Entente, the peace-force which forms the nucleus of every standing army and which forms the regular and most expensive part of war-preparations, was *nearly three times as big* as that of the two central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary—a fact which seems almost sufficient to prove which side was preparing war against the other!

Italian Navy will never be found arrayed against the British Navy," and he begs it "to be understood that although Italy has been included by him in some hypothetical anti-British combinations, the assumption is adopted solely for statistical purposes."

It is therefore erroneous to believe that these powerful preparations which weighed on Europe, and their constant increase, were due to German politics. Still more erroneous is the notion, widespread though it be, that the system of armed peace, that "Modern Militarism," so to speak, is a German invention. On the contrary, it is a purely French invention. Public opinion is quickly made to forget the origin of an institution, but History does not lose sight of great events. It was Lazare Carnot, member of the "Comité de Salut Public," who invented the "levées en masses," the transforming of the whole nation into an immense army. It was Napoleon who used for his conquests the instrument that the republic had prepared for him and who threatened the whole world by militarising the French nation to the youngest boy who was able to carry arms. Remembering past danger, and desirous of preventing its return, Prussia—and

after the foundation of the Empire, Germany—adopted and perfected the French system.

Germany had every reason to adopt this system. The reader is requested to give one short look at the map. He will see Germany in her central situation, with an open border on every side, without any natural defences, any natural frontier—with the sole exception of the Austrian border,—with a widely stretched coast open to any aggression, particularly if England were to be among her enemies. The German borderline is long, flat, absolutely open towards Russia. The Vosges mountains which form the French border, are of easy access from the French side. Steep and ragged towards Germany, they form a kind of bulwark only for France. They are, as they have proved in the present war, a convenient door for inroads into Germany.

A single look at the map is sufficient to show

that Germany, unless surrounded by friends and allies, had to maintain an efficient army, if she intended to continue her existence unimpaired. She had a friend, an ally in the south only. In the east, along an unprotected borderline of about a thousand miles in length, her neighbour was immense Russia, with almost double the number of inhabitants, with an army of many millions of men. Nicolas I—the great-grandfather of the present Czar—said as early as 1849 to the French General Lamoricière: “If, against my wish and yours, Germany should succeed in becoming a unified state, she will, in order to enjoy her regained union, need a man able to do what Napoleon himself could not accomplish. And if such a man should be born, if the armed mass should become dangerous, it will be incumbent on us, on France and Russia, to subdue her!”¹ That

¹ Letter of General Lamoricière to Alexis de Tocqueville, published in Tocqueville’s “Souvenirs,” Paris, 1893, p. 383.

was the feeling and the program in Russia in 1849. Nicolas II, the present Czar, concluded the Treaty of Alliance with France which was to realize this program. In addition, Russia was the rival and irreconcilable enemy of Austria, Germany's only reliable friend,—but more of this later.

That France was Germany's enemy, that she would have gladly profited by any occasion to humiliate her may be called a truism. I do not believe there is a Frenchman who will deny that France's alliance with Russia was prompted by a desire to regain her two much loved provinces. Whether or not this desire was justifiable from the French standpoint, it was certainly a serious menace to the peace of the German people.

And if in English politics such a change took place as to make friends not only with France after having stood at the brink of war with her, but even with Russia, her arch enemy of old,—

there is but one Power against which her policy could be directed. There never existed any doubt about this in the world.

During all this time the German Empire had not changed its political attitude toward one of the three Powers. As to Russia, an old friendship united the two dynasties. Germany gave a signal proof of it in 1904. There was even too much of friendship for Russia, many people felt.

Germany never had had a quarrel with England, never even the thought of a quarrel with her. The Imperial Government remained firm even during the Boer War, when popular feeling in Germany—as indeed all over Europe—seemed to demand an intervention, less out of animosity toward England than out of sympathy for the two Dutch republics. As late as August 6, 1914, Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Parliament that “for many years and indeed generations past Germany had been a friendly Power.”

The danger that Germany might ever make an aggressive war on England was altogether chimerical. The fact that Germany accepted the British proposal of keeping the respective numbers of battleships at the ratio of 16: 10 is proof of Germany's attitude.

There had been times of tension between Germany and France, particularly concerning Morocco, where both Powers had great commercial interests. But the difficulties had been adjusted, certainly not to the disadvantage of France. Moreover, it is a known fact that Germany—foreseeing great danger from other parts—ardently wished to reconcile France. There is a most interesting letter from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey,—published in the English Blue Book (on page 78, No. 159). While relating his last decisive interview with the German Foreign Secretary on August 4, in which he stated for the second time

that "unless Germany could give the assurance that they would stop their advance in Belgium he should have to demand his passports," the Ambassador states: "In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain to get closer to France." After this Sir E. Goschen went to see the Chancellor, whom he found "very agitated"; and who said: "that Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office, had tumbled down like a house of cards." Now these are statements, which statesmen in office would not make, unless "very agi-

tated." But the change in British politics from diplomatic into warlike moves was overwhelming. Germany had never taken one aggressive step against England, had in fact since the time of the Berlin Congress taken many in her favor. She was satisfied to "have her place in the sun," satisfied to see her own growing industry and commerce, to develop her social legislation, to develop the tendencies of art, music, science, and invention, inborn in the nation.

In this development England scented danger to her own prosperity, but instead of rejuvenating the inner structure of her Empire on the basis of good old English ideals, she chose the easier way of forming diplomatic alliances with Russia, France, Japan, and Portugal. The result of this war and the development of the next generation will show whether a strengthening of England by these auxiliaries which lay outside

of the Kingdom, was as sound as the consolidation of the inner forces of its rival.

Germany, ever rising during peace, had no reason to risk, by a dangerous war, the great results she had attained.

According to this view, they arranged the bias of their politics and made their preparations. Of the nations that encircled Germany by the most powerful league the world has ever seen, it was England's task to increase the sphere of diplomatic influence, which she succeeded in doing by attaching Japan and Portugal.

France organized her "*force noire*,"¹ Russia in 1912 created the "Balkan-League." This league would have added another million of warriors to the army which the powers of the Triple-Entente could have opposed to Germany and

¹ A book was published in France in 1908 by an officer, Lt.-Col Mangin, in which the author divulges that, by realizing her plans, France would soon be able to hurl 100,000 Arabs and 40,000 black men into the first battle which would take place at

Austria, had things but gone as was hoped for. One could scarcely attribute it to an excess of caution when, seeing this tremendous array and increase of forces around her, the German Government demanded sums for the necessary increase of her own defence in the form of the "*Wehrbeitrag*," and at the same time induced Austria to hasten the completion of her much neglected preparations. Yet such was the effect of a clever agitation and of long repeated assertions that all Europe was made to see in this a confirmation of Germany's threatening attitude toward her neighbours, and even clever men credited the legend that France was forced to introduce the very unpopular law of the Three Years' Service as a measure against the results

the end of the third week after the declaration of war. The author is fully confident—as early as in 1908—that the "Allies" of France would hold the Atlantic open for the transportation of that force. The reader may judge how carefully the Anglo-French plans have been prepared, how exactly they have been carried out!

of the German *Wehrbeitrag*.¹ I confess that I would have believed it myself had I not happened to be in France at the time, where a well-known politician told me that the French bill had been prepared by the war-office two months before anybody had had the least notice of the German plan. It is only to avoid giving annoyance that I am silent about his name.

Finally, in the year 1913, the French Ambassador in Petersburg, M. Delcassé, arranged with the Russian Government for a further loan of 2½ milliards of francs, which sum France was to furnish to Russia in five annual rates for the chief purpose of the construction of strategic railways on the German and Austrian borders. The purpose was openly avowed; the proposed lines were mentioned with every necessary de-

¹ Compare the passage concerning that law in the Note of M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, of March 17, 1913 (French Yellow Book No. 1).

tail in the treaty presented to the French Chamber, as well as in the bill which was brought before the Duma; the whole matter was discussed for weeks in French papers and reviews of all kinds, but being adopted by Russia and France against Germany, it does not seem to have been considered a threatening step. Quite to the contrary, it was all done in the interest of peace.

These were public transactions; others which might seem almost still more important were secret, though they did not remain so to the German Government. In November, 1912, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador in London, M. Paul Cambon, exchanged letters of almost literally the same tenor, which ran thus:

Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general

peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Government would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours,
E. GREY.

These important documents were not published until September, 1914, but they had come to the knowledge of the German Government as early as in March, 1913. Formally they were not to "restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force." In the English letter it is even carefully stated that the "contingency has not arisen and may never arise"; the omission of the same words in the French Ambassador's letter is rather remarkable. But to be-

lieve that, because of these restrictions, the exchange of the two letters was a mere act of international courtesy would be a glaring absurdity. Ministers of Great Powers do not write such letters or arrange consultations of military and naval experts without most seriously considering and desiring a future co-operation in war. They could not express their common resolve in a more binding form without disclosing their plans to the eyes of all the world. A formal treaty would have required the sanction of the English Parliament; the debate would have proven to all the world who was really preparing for war and endangering the peace of Europe. Moreover, it was to be feared that the majority of the English Parliament would refuse to sanction the proceeding of the Government. It was Sir Edward Grey's business to prepare English public opinion for the "contingency that might never arise," and still more to convince

the Parliament of the necessity of co-operation with France when the contingency had come. He could therefore not go further than he did. He remained cautious to the last. He wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, on July 31, 1914, when the danger of a general conflagration was imminent: "I have told the French Ambassador that we should not be justified in giving a definite pledge to intervene in a war at the present moment but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development." (Brit. Blue Book No. 1116; French Yellow Book No. 1110.) An English statesman is a very responsible person, the Commons and Public Opinion are his masters, and he has to manage them carefully in order to make them do his will. The "new development" could not fail to arrive.

Such was the condition of affairs as far as England and France were concerned. Negotia-

tions for bringing about a similar agreement for future military, and more particularly naval, co-operation between England and Russia, began in the spring of 1914, at the occasion of King George's visit to Paris. It seems that the idea was M. Iswolskij's. It was warmly recommended by Sir Edward Grey in the English Cabinet. On May 26, a conference, presided over by the chief of the Russian Navy Staff, took place in St. Petersburg. This conference came to the conclusion that a naval agreement was highly desirable and that an understanding should be effected between the two navies concerning signals, ciphers, and wireless telegraphy; that both staffs should communicate on all questions of interest, and that strategic co-operation in the case of war should be prepared. Operations of the Russian fleet in the Bosphorus, in the Dardanelles, and in the Mediterranean should be discussed. But the most interesting part of the

plan outlined is the following: England should force as many German ships as possible to remain in the North-Sea, and to facilitate a Russian invasion of the German coast, the English Government should send as many transport-ships as possible to Russian ports before the beginning of maritime operations, that is to say in time of peace.

If Sir Edward Grey's policy was not hostile to Germany and a menace to the peace of Europe, what policy may be called hostile and a menace to peace? And if this was not preparing war against Germany, what is preparing war against a country?

It is an extraordinary institution which permits a statesman to conclude most important and even fatal "agreements" with foreign Powers and yet enables him to say in Parliament again and again and even as late as on the third of August, 1914: "I have assured the House that

if any crisis such as this arose the House of Commons should be free to decide what the British attitude should be; that there was no secret engagement which the Government could spring upon the House and tell the House that, because they had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country!"

No, indeed, it was not a question of honour, it was all a matter of sagacious management!

It was this mode of procedure which caused Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to write in the "Labour Leader": "During the last eight years Sir Edward Grey has been a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy disastrous to England!" while a liberal member of the British Parliament, Mr. Ponsonby, wrote in the "Nation" that "he could find Sir Edward Grey's agreements neither right nor reasonable."

Sir Edward Grey as a constitutional minister had to employ great diplomacy in his choice of

words. Mr. Sazónof as a Russian minister had an easier task. When asked by a German statesman about the naval agreement—for this time every stage of the negotiations had immediately come to the knowledge of the German Government, and thanks to French indiscretion even the press had got hints of it—when thus questioned, Mr. Sazónof bluntly answered that “such an agreement only existed in the moon and in the imagination of the *‘Berliner Tageblatt.’*”

Contrast with these utterances the well-remembered speech made by the German Emperor in the London Guildhall; and later in Bremen on March 22, 1905: “History has taught me never to aspire to the hollow ideal of a Universal Monarchy. I have sworn to myself that this thought shall never enter my soul. What has become of all the large empires which were extended over a great part of the world? Alexander the Great, Napoleon, all the great warriors weltered in

blood and at their death left conquered nations which arose at the first occasion. And the Empires soon crumbled to pieces. The world-wide Empire of which I dream will come into existence when the new German Empire will be recognized as a quiet, honest, and peaceful neighbour, when it will enjoy the fullest confidence from every side; and if History should ever record a German Universal Monarchy, a world-wide rule of the Hohenzollern, such rule and such Monarchy shall not be founded on conquests won by the sword but on the mutual confidence of nations striving for the same ends. To express it in the words of the great poet I wish it to be "Limited in its boundaries, boundless inwardly!"

That the monarch, who has now been so unjustly abused by a hostile press, was sincere, that he really gave expression to his inmost thought, is proven by the fact that he has kept his word and stuck to his resolution for full

twenty-six years, in spite of various occasions which might have well drawn him into war. In doing so he has only acted in accordance with the spirit of the nation. Everybody who knows the German nation knows how essentially peaceful it is by nature. Perhaps, for the very reason that it is so slow to be stirred, it is so terrible in war, when once aroused. If any one thing above all others has obtained for the Emperor the love of his subjects, the esteem and well-meaning even of radicals and socialists, it is the fact that he has kept peace for so long a period. Compared with such fundamentals, the war cries of the jingoes, or clever and enthusiastic books on war, written by generals out of service, prove nothing. In the Parliament there was absolutely no war-party at all, and in the Nation the party that advocated war was small to insignificance.

It is curious to observe the contrast between William II and Napoleon III, who when he be-

came Emperor of France in 1852 pronounced the famous words: "*L'Empire c'est la paix!*" and who, only two years later, undertook the Crimean War (1854), made war on Austria in 1859, undertook the expedition to Mexico in 1862, the Italian expedition in 1867, and the war against Germany in 1870—all of this in the short eighteen years of his reign.

III. THE CRISIS

RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN QUESTION

When the diplomatic group which formed the Triple-Entente prepared for the war, they prepared for a war on their own terms, that is to say, when the Russian fleet would be reconstructed, the Russian railway completed, the French army perfected and increased by the Three Years' Service, the unity among the Balkan Slavs restored, and Turkey—which might be expected to side with Germany—reduced to utter prostration and helplessness.

But suddenly the Servian question projected itself as an appalling crisis.

It is impossible, nor would it be of importance to speak here at any length of the constant troubles in the Balkans which so often have kept

Europe in tension and in fear of imminent war. Of the four Christian nations which live in the Peninsula the Servians and the Roumanians are Austria's neighbours. But the relations between Austria and Servia are much older and have always been incomparably more intimate than those between Austria and Roumania. The borderline between Austria and the two Servian countries, Servia and Montenegro, is more than four hundred miles in length. In the Middle Ages the Servians had repeatedly been rescued from the Turks by Hungarian armies. When they were finally subjugated, in the fifteenth century, a great part of them fled to Hungary and settled there for good, in the two provinces called Bacska and Bánat. In later times those who had passed under the Mussulman yoke were again freed by the Austrians under Prince Eugene. In the eighteenth century Servia had long been an Austrian province. And when reconquered by the

Turks, the Servians repeatedly rose up and wanted to return to Austrian rule, although the Imperial Government was, in those times, scarcely less despotic. The same desire was expressed by them more than once during the nineteenth century. It was not until then that the rival influence of Russia began to make itself felt. Since that time the Servians were assisted now by the one and now by the other power and finally the inhabitants of the present kingdom recovered their full independence, in 1878, by fighting successfully against the Turks after the latter had been defeated by the Russians and the Roumanians at Plevna. The control of Bosnia and Herzegovina was allotted to Austria-Hungary in the same year at the Berlin Congress, remaining nominally under Turkish suzerainty from which it had in reality been freed.

In the new kingdom of Servia Austrian influence was soon again predominant and remained

so for many years. When in 1885 the Bulgarians defeated the Servian army at Slivnitsa, Austria saved Servia by the threat of an armed intervention in her behalf. There was, however, a Russophile as well as an Austrophile party in Servia.

Russian agents, certainly not for love of their "Servian brethren" but rather from political opposition to Austria—incited the Nationalist party in Servia to strive toward uniting under the same rule the whole territory inhabited by their race. For, only about 3,000,000 Serbo-Croatians, as the race is called, live in the Kingdom of Servia, while no less than 5,000,000 live in Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. That the Servians of Servia should wish to reconquer this whole big territory and in this way become the most powerful state in the Peninsula may perhaps be considered quite natural. But certainly it is quite as natural and even much

more natural that Austria should regard such aspiration with disquietude and should refuse to part with five millions of her people, most of whom have lived under her rule for centuries and only a very small number of whom after much secret agitation and more or less secret bribery, would willingly go from her and be incorporated in the kingdom of "Greater Servia."

There is another point of view from which the question is to be regarded and which is never kept in mind by foreign writers—the matter of religion, so much more powerful in those parts than race or nationality can ever become. The 3,000,000 Servians of Servia are almost all Orthodox¹; while of the 3,500,000 Servians who live in Austria and Hungary 2½ millions are Roman Catholics (it is they who call themselves Croatsians) and of the 1,500,000 Servians in Bos-

¹ That is to say, members of the Greek Church. They are 3,000,000 or more since the aggrandizement of the Kingdom in 1912.

nia and Herzegovina almost two-thirds are either Catholic or Mahometan. Now both Mahometans and Catholics look on the Orthodox Servians with abhorrence. They would as soon think of going to perdition as of becoming the countrymen of the "Servians"; they have proven their feelings by their fury in the present war. The Catholic Servians, the Croatians, have always been the staunchest adherents and most faithful subjects of the Austrian Dynasty. The oldest Infantry Regiment in the Austrian Army, the 53d Warasdin Regiment, is a Croatian regiment, and none has fought so brilliantly in Servia in the present war as this particular regiment.

Administration is certainly much better in the Austrian parts than in the Kingdom. Commerce, agriculture, industry are flourishing in quite another way in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Servia; justice, public security and of-

ficial integrity are to be found there in a degree unknown in Servia.

Let us compare the results attained in Bosnia and Herzegovina which have now been under Austro-Hungarian control for 36 years with the corresponding achievements in the Kingdom, the foundation of which coincides with that of the provinces. We shall find that under an able government the progress of Bosnia has been such as could never have been attained in the Kingdom. Though the birth rate has increased in about an equal degree, the increase of Commerce—import and export together,—in Bosnia was, in spite of the smaller population, from 8 millions of crowns in 1879 to 226 millions in 1906 and 277 millions in 1910; in Servia from 80 millions in 1879 to 127 millions in 1906 and 204 millions in 1910. The number of horses in Bosnia in 1879 was 160,000; in 1895 it had increased to 237,000, while their number in Servia in 1906, that is eleven

years later, amounted to only 172,000 head. Neat cattle in Bosnia increased in the same time from 762,000 to 1,417,000 head; in Servia, on the other hand, the number as late as in 1906 was 932,000 head. Bosnia contains thrice the number of goats, many more sheep; only swine are slightly more numerous in Servia. If the amount of cattle in the provinces has since remained more or less stationary, the fact is chiefly owing to the ever increasing export of cattle to the Empire. Though Bosnia is a more mountainous and barren country than Servia and though the latter's population is bigger by more than a million, the railways constructed in Bosnia were 963 km. in length in 1902, while in Servia they measured only 562 km. in 1906. Similar is the proportion as to public roads and highways.¹ For the provincial Diet, whose constituencies are di-

¹ It is but fair to state that the division of landed property, the situation of the peasantry, seems better in the Kingdom, owing to special difficulties in the provinces; the redemption of

vided according to religion, as being the decisive distinction in the land, the Catholics elect 30 members, the Mahometans 42, the Jews 1 and the Orthodox Servians 54 members, so that there is certainly no injustice done to the Orthodox.

I do not mean to say that the Austrian Government in treating Servia may never have made a mistake. But where is the Government to be found that never has made a mistake? Particularly in a situation where intricate political and social problems had to be solved, where conflicting interests—agrarian and commercial—demanded satisfaction, where national and religious questions had to be settled.

How easy in comparison was the task of the Russian diplomatists! Separated from Servia by two interjacent countries—Roumania, and Bulgaria—with no commercial relations to speak the “Kmets,” the replacement of tenants by or their change into freeholders in Bosnia is, however, going on at a very progressive rate.

of,¹ no political problem or interest that interfered with her own, Russia, distant and unconcerned, had in reality no interests at all in Serbia save those instilled by ambition; her agents therefore had only to bribe, to give promises, and to create difficulties for the Austrian Government.

Nothing is more easily stirred up in our days than Nationalist-feelings; and though only a small part even of the Orthodox Servians, that is of the minority of Servians living in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Hungary could be misled, the Pan-Servian Propaganda, secretly and even openly encouraged and assisted by the Servian authorities, could not fail to lead to trouble.

Servian hostility increased when Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and

¹ Almost all the commerce of Servia is with Austria and Hungary; only a small part of the export trade goes to Italy and Egypt; 60 per cent. of imported goods come from Austria, the rest from Germany, France and other countries.

Herzegovina to her Empire, though in doing so it changed only in form what had been an accomplished fact since the Berlin Congress in 1878. The Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Now it always hurts the "feelings and interests" of a person or a people to see a thing definitely put into another man's possession which they crave for themselves; but we are absolutely unable to conceive any right of Servia to possess these provinces, unless it be deduced from the fact that in the Middle Ages—some seven hundred years ago—Servian kings had ruled them and that a small part of the population are Orthodox Servians to this day. With much the same right Austria could claim a considerable part of Switzerland, because in the Middle Ages it had been in her dominion and because

a good part of the population are Germans and Catholics to this day!

Austria had been commissioned to occupy the provinces by a European Congress; she had conquered them by force of arms, not from the Serbians, remember, but from the Mahometans, their deadly enemies. She had given the provinces an excellent administration and brought them to a flourishing condition, such as they never had known before; she had reconciled the Mahometans living in those provinces and converted them into her most loyal subjects; she had invested immense capital—only a madman could imagine that she would ever give them up again. The annexation was but the official and formal expression of an actual state of things that had lasted since the Berlin Congress. Turkey, of course, had a formal right to protest against the annexation, but never Servia. And as to Turkey,

Austria has since come to an agreement with her upon the subject.

All this has to be said because in the Introduction to the British Blue Book the annexation of Bosnia is mentioned casually and in such a way as to create the impression that great wrong had been done to Servia, while all the real import of the event is carefully passed in silence.

The Servians of Servia, however, stirred up by a highly nationalistic propaganda, became deeply incensed by the annexation, and their irritation increased when, after their successes in the Balkan War in 1912, Austria formally opposed and prevented their being put into possession of a port on the Adriatic. Everybody will, of course, understand their irritation on that head; yet Austria could not act otherwise without grievously damaging herself, so long as Servia acted as a vassal-state of Russia, blindly obeying the Russian Ambassador's orders. A Ser-

vian port on the Adriatic would have served as a harbour to the fleet of any hostile power that was allied with Russia; the Franco-English fleet would have found in it an excellent point of support in the present war. For this reason Austria could not consent to what she would willingly have granted to Serbia if she had not only been her neighbour but also her friend. Under the actual conditions she could as little consent to such an acquisition being made by Serbia as the United States could consent to a port near San Francisco being occupied by a power that was absolutely dependent on Japan. Otherwise Austria presented no obstacle to the expansion of Serbia, which during the last Balkan war had vastly increased its territory.

After the murder of the last King of the house of Obrenovic the Russophile party acquired ascendancy in Belgrade, and the treasonable Pan-Servian agitation in the Austro-Hungarian

provinces began to increase in violence. It may be sufficient to state that a Servian nationalist society in the kingdom, called the "*Narodna Obrana*," with which 762 sharpshooters' companies were affiliated, kept two schools in which armed bands—"komitatschis"—were trained in the art of throwing bombs, laying mines, blowing up railway-bridges and similar practices.

In the paper edited by the "*Narodna Obrana*" a "war of extermination" was preached against Austria as being the "first and greatest enemy of the Servian race."

Secret societies in Austria were organized; a particular organisation was founded among Servian students in Austria for the purpose of "liberating the Slavs of the South"; its statutes proclaimed that "revolution had to be prepared by acts of terrorism." In fact, a series of attempts on the life of high Austro-Hungarian officials followed.

On June 8, 1912, the Royal Commissary for Croatia, Baron Cuvaj, was wounded while driving through the streets of Agram, and Councillor von Herwic, who was sitting in the same car, killed by a man called Jukic. The perpetrator of this crime had just returned from Belgrade, where he had been furnished with a bomb and a browning by an officer of the Servian army.

On August 18, of the same year, a certain Stefan Dojcic made a similar attempt on the life of Commissary Baron Skerlecz.

On May 2, 1913, Jacob Schäfer tried to assassinate Baron Skerlecz, who in the meantime had been appointed *Banus* (Governor) of Croatia.

Readers are also to bear in mind that the reigning King Peter of Servia owes his crown to the murder perpetrated on his predecessor, King Alexander.

A certain Bogdan Serajic who had tried to assassinate the governor of Bosnia, General Baron

Varesanin, was even glorified in Servian papers as a national hero.

Assassination is in fact an established form of political agitation in Servia.

In Servian school-books, nay, in the very guide-books which were sold to travellers and which are written in the German language, the Austro-Hungarian provinces are called the "parts of Servia which are not yet freed from the foreign yoke." The simplest Austrian students of Servian race who came to visit Belgrade were sure to be received by the Servian Crown-Prince or at least by Servian generals. On the wall of the Servian war-office at Belgrade an allegory is painted representing an armed female on whose shield are written the names of the "unredeemed" Austrian provinces. The schools in which the above-mentioned banditti were trained for future armed inroads into Austria were inspected at regular intervals by the President of the

"Narodna Obrana," the Servian general Boso Jankovic.¹

This Pan-Servian movement was a serious danger because it tended to a dismemberment of the Empire and could not but lead to war.

There has been a widespread though erroneous notion in foreign countries that Austria was a state which threatened dissolution and which could not hold together much longer. Nothing could be more false than this idea which has proven one of the great mistakes of Austria's enemies. With all her political dissensions, her national difficulties, the dual monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is a unity, bound together by old historical ties and new economic interests, by an administration in most parts excellent, by

¹ See depositions of prisoners and witnesses during the trial in Sarajewo, particularly of Misko Jovanovics and Lazar Kranjcsevics, prisoners, examined on October 17; Trifko Krstanovics, witness, examined on October 20; depositions of Lazar Stanarincsevics and Dragan Public, witnesses, read on October 20 and 21.

a national army, and by a deep and universal feeling for the reigning house. The twelve or more races who form the population of the Empire are geographically so intermixed that it would be difficult to sever them. If these races, whose population varies from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 9 millions, were made independent, there would be endless internecine war between them. History has organized them in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and though quarrelling—as parties will do in a country inhabited by a homogeneous population—they have learnt to understand their common interests, and they are ready to die, nay, they are actually giving their lives by thousands for the Empire that unites them through a common bond. If the Federated Empire of Austro-Hungary did not exist, it would have to be invented and constructed in order to save the population of the fertile regions along the Danube from eternal war and anarchy.

Suddenly the Pan-Servian movement sprang a ferrible climax; the murder of Sarajevo sent its horrors through the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through all the world.

In all Servian towns the news of the murder produced public rejoicing: In Belgrade, in Ueskub, in Nisch, people embraced each other in the streets, exclamations of joy were heard in the coffee-houses. The president of the local committee of the Narodna Obrana in Nisch made a speech in which he said: "Servia has been saved by this deed, and one of those who were dangerous to her is out of the way. Now Servia will have peace for several years, for the new heir of the Austrian throne will beware of walking in the steps of his predecessor!" (Reports of Austro-Hungarian Consuls, etc. Red Book No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, Encl. 10.)

The Austrian Government waited till the inquiry had proven that the murderers of the Arch-

duke had not only been furnished with bombs¹ and pistols from the Servian State Arsenal at Kragujewac, but also had been instructed in the use of these arms by Servian officers, particularly by Major Tankosic; that one of them, Cabrinowic, the man who threw the bomb at the Archduke's automobile, had had an audience given to him by the Servian Crown-Prince Alexander; that the murderers had been led over the Bosnian border by Servian police officers, etc.²

Only when all this had been proven beyond

¹ The bombs were of the particular kind of hand-grenades used in the Servian army.

² One cannot help feeling pity for these poor misled boys who perpetrated the deed, and indignation toward those who cowardly thrust them into crime and misery, when one reads the last words which one of them, Nedelko Cabrinowic, uttered at the end of the trial. He said that the idea of murdering the Archduke had not originated in their own minds; that they had been taught in Belgrade to look upon such a deed as noble and beautiful; that they were all sorry for it, though Gawrilo Princip might choose to take a hero's attitude; that they had not known that the Archduke had children; that they repented what they had done and implored pardon of the children; that they were no criminals, but had sacrificed themselves for what they believed to be a good cause.

a doubt, only then did the Austrian Government present the well-known ultimatum to Serbia, on July 24. Unquestionably by this action absolute submission from Serbia was intended. A deserved submission and a necessary one. The English and the Russian Ambassadors at Vienna repeatedly said in their telegrams, that they "thought" or "had heard" that the German Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky, had advised the Austrian Government to be severe.¹ There is, however, not the slightest evidence of the fact that the German Ambassador really did so, at any rate there was no need of such advice.

¹ In a note of July 22d the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, declares, without however giving proof of any kind (Yellow Book No. 18), that Herr von Tschirschky expressed his inclination to violent measures against Serbia, giving at the same time to understand that his Government were not quite of his opinion. No place nor date being given, the acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, in a note dated on the following day (Yellow Book No. 20) added—as a piece of evidence afforded by his creative fancy—that Herr von Tschirschky had made utterances of this kind in "the diplomatic circles of Vienna."

Austria had tolerated only too long what no other state could or would have tolerated, and she had done so for the sole reason that the old Emperor wished to end his reign in peace. Now things could be tolerated no longer. Indignation was running high at the court, in the church, in the press, through the whole people. There is no nation in the world that would not and has not made war on less provocation. There is no monarchy in the world that would permit the heir-apparent of the throne to be murdered with the guilty connivance of another country's government without making war on that country, unless the most perfect, the most humble, the most instantaneous atonement was offered. There is no Power in the world that would have tolerated another Power's intercession in such a case. Supposing that the Russian Czarewitsch or the Viceroy of India had been murdered by Afghans with the connivance of the Afghan Court and

Government—I most humbly beg Afghanistan's pardon for the supposition—what would the Russian, what would the English Government have done, what penance, what atonement would they have asked or accepted, especially if the murder had been but the climax of many that had gone before! Would they really have been contented with “concern and regret,” as Sir Edward Grey proposed Serbia ought to express?¹ It was a useless task for diplomats to analyze and criticize the answer which the Servian Government gave to the Austrian note, on July 25, and to discuss how far it could be considered as satisfactory or as the basis of further negotiations. It could not be considered at all, because only absolute submission was intended. Moreover, the answer was for the most part evasive. Besides, Servian promises had been given before and had always

¹ In his note to the British *Chargé d’Affaires* at Belgrade of July 24, Blue Book No. 12.

proved ineffective and unreliable.¹ The whole Servian note, even the apparent concessions which it contained, were in fact a mockery; for while it was handed to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, at 6 o'clock on July 25, at 3 o'clock on the same day the Servian Government had issued the order for general mobilisation. (Notes of Baron Giesl to Count Berchtold of July 25; of Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff of July 26. Red Book No. 22, 23, 29.) And what nation will accept a few promises to take care in the future if possible, as a satisfaction for the murder of the chief representative of the State, the Heir to the Crown? How

¹Only one small instance: On July 25 the British *Chargé d'Affaires* at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "The Servian Government have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note." I have no doubt that Mr. Crackanthorpe had been informed to that effect; but in fact Major Tankosic has never been arrested. He was allowed to escape, and later he returned to Belgrade. Afterwards he was severely wounded, fighting in the Servian ranks, and is now lying in a hospital at Nisch.

often have the guns of British warships thundered at foreign ports because a British subject's storehouse had been plundered or his bills refused?

On July 26, war between Austria and Servia became inevitable. It would have been "localised," that is to say, it would have remained a war between Austria and Servia but for the intervention of Russia.

This fact is the nucleus, and at the same time the explanation of the war that is now ruining so many peaceful and flourishing countries; it is the cause of such immense bloodshed, and it is almost needless to follow the stages of the diplomatic Calvary that led to the outbreak of the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.

Servia's unsatisfactory reply would never have been given but for the advice of the same persons who had encouraged all the Servian proceedings which led to the final catastrophe. On

the very day on which the Austrian note was communicated to the Servian Government, July 23, the Crown-Prince-Regent of Servia wrote an imploring letter to the Czar. (Published in the Russian Orange Book as No. 10.) We do not know whether the telegram from St. Petersburg with the short and energetic advice "Mobilize! we are mobilizing also!" was really sent from St. Petersburg to Belgrade, or whether it represents only one of those happy historical legends which originate on the spot and, though not absolutely correct, are highly expressive of the actual situation.

It is certainly most astonishing that the Russian Orange Book observes an absolute silence on the notes exchanged between the Russian and Servian Governments during the important forty-eight hours which elapsed between the moment of the communication of the Austrian Ultimatum in Belgrade and the Servian Reply. The

official Russian publication contains nothing but the answer given by the Czar to the Crown-Prince (No. 40), which was not written until July 27. It is evident that the Russian Government does not wish to have it known by the public of Europe or America what advice it gave to Servia in those critical days, and its silence is a confession of its guilt. But for Russia's encouragement Servia would have been forced to yield and to give Austria the satisfaction desired; thus might even the war between Austria and Servia have been avoided.

That the Russian Government was from the very first considering war against Austria—which, as it knew, meant war against Germany also—is proven by an important passage in a note from Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, on July 24 (Brit. Blue Book No. 6), according to which the Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof, as his per-

sonal opinion, that "an unconditional engagement on the British Government's part to support Russia and France by force of arms was not to be expected." The Ambassador then asked whether, if Austria proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia, it was the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria? Thereupon M. Sazónof answered that the "Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out" and that "a decision would be come to" probably on the next day at a council which the Czar would preside. In his next note, dated July 25 (Bl. B. Note No. 17), the British Ambassador says that he expressed the earnest hope that "Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until Sir Edward Grey had had time to use his influence in favour of peace," whereupon M. Sazónof assured him that "Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's

action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude would be decided by ours (the British attitude) . . .” Sir G. Buchanan concludes with the following words:—“I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and *warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once.* His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, *she will face all the risks of war.* He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany

could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate."

This is plain language. It proves several interesting things. First that English statesmen in the beginning of the crisis stood aghast at the possible consequences and were not desirous of a general conflict at that moment, while on the contrary Russia was quite resolute now to "face all the risks of war." The conversation reported in the note proves further that even the Russian Minister, according to his own words, did not believe that Germany wanted war, and that even the English Ambassador recognized the necessity which would compel Germany to declare war if Russia mobilised.

When, on July 23, Sir Edward Grey had attempted to explain to the Austrian Ambassador at London, Count Mensdorff, how terrible the consequences of the ultimatum might be, Count Mensdorff had answered, that "all depended on

Russia." This was so very clear that even Sir Edward Grey could only give a diplomatic answer which said nothing at all. Sir G. Buchanan had stated to M. Sazónof that "direct British interests in Servia were nil"; the same might be said of France; Germany had repeatedly declared that she had no interest there. There was an unquestionable conflict between Austria and Servia because the latter had instigated a revolutionary movement on Austro-Hungarian territory and had sent out murderers who had killed the heir apparent of the throne. The Austrian Government had declared in the most formal manner that it did not aim at territorial aggrandizement in Servia. All this was so very clear that Sir Edward Grey had found nothing to say in answer to Count Mensdorff, and Russian diplomats could only note the "icy indifference" with which Servian complaints met in English official circles. In fact, the British Ambassador

in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, said to Count Berchtold as late as on July 28: "The English Government have followed the development of the crisis with great interest and wish to assure the Austrian Government that they feel all sympathy for their standpoint and perfectly understand their griefs against Servia." (Red Book No. 41.) There was at that time nobody in the diplomatic world—or indeed anywhere at all—who did not see and feel that all depended on Russia.

When, however, in the course of the next days or rather hours—so quickly the situation developed into a crisis—it became clear that Russia intended to interfere, France and England, her allies, at once altered their view; things suddenly ceased to depend on Russia, and the responsibility was quickly shuffled off to Germany. They found out that Germany was bound to exert an influence upon Austria in order to make her

change her measures as far as they gave displeasure to Russia.

On July 24, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, informed the Chancellor that M. Sazonof had "indulged in immoderate accusations against Austria and had declared in the most positive way that Russia could by no means permit the Austro-Servian difference to be settled between the two parties alone." (Tel. of July 24, German White Book No. 4.) Thereupon the French Government changed its tone.¹

¹ In an article in the "Figaro" entitled "Un Faux Allemand," M. Denys Cochin, the well-known Royalist member of the French Chamber of Deputies, declared that the date of Count Pourtalès' telegram, as given in the White Book, must needs be a falsification, the Russian threats having not been uttered until a Russian demand for prolongation of the time-limit in the Austrian Ultimatum had been refused by the Austrian Government. He concludes this from the fact that this Russian demand is quoted in the Russian Orange Book (No. 15) as dated July 24. In fact, the falsification—it may, of course, be an error due to Russian inexactness—is to be found in the Russian Orange Book, and M. Denys Cochin is in error in all his statements. The Russian demand for a prolongation of the time-limit was tele-

This change in the attitude of the English and French Cabinets was very curious and important.

The situation was perfectly clear. If France and England, who had no interests at all at stake in Servia, accepted the Russian view, for the sole reason that Russia was their friend and ally,

graphed by the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* in Vienna, Prince Koudascheff, to Count Berchtold, who had left for Ischl to confer with the Emperor on July 25. The negative answer, therefore, could not possibly reach the Russian Embassy in Vienna, and still less the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, until later in the course of the day (July 25), while the Russian threats had been published by the Viennese papers in their morning editions of the same day. It is, therefore, quite evident that the threatening utterances of the Russian Cabinet must needs have been made before and not after the demand for a prorogation of the time-limit, the refusal of which demand they and their French friend now wish to pass off as the cause of their hostile attitude.

The attempt to find such an excuse is the more preposterous, as in a note of the French Ambassador at Vienna, M. Dumaine, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of July 25 (published in the French Yellow Book as No. 45), not only the real date of the telegrams (two having been sent, one to reach Count Berchtold on his way, and one to Ischl) is stated as being the 25th of July—but the confession is added that Prince Koudascheff did not expect that his telegrams would have the slightest effect; literally: "*Il n'en attend aucun effet.*"

why should Germany not be allowed to take the side of her friend and ally Austria, whom she knew, moreover, to be perfectly in the right? Why should she also be bound to accept the views of Russia, who was neither her friend nor her ally and whom she knew to be thoroughly in the wrong? Austria had the greatest interest in a decisive and final solution of the difficulties produced by Servian agitation and assassinations. Austria had been frightfully wronged; if her Government desisted from exacting necessary reparation, Austria would become an object of contempt to the Balkans as well as to her own population. Why then should Germany be bound to give her advice which she must needs know to be bad, and which would never be accepted unless the German Government exerted such pressure as to do irreparable harm to her faithful friend and ally! It may be that such an estrangement between the two central Powers was one of

the objects in view; Russia, at any rate, had been wronged by nobody, no revolutionary agitation in her provinces had been encouraged, no grand-duke had been killed; nobody had asked anything of her but to keep quiet—and because Russia would not keep quiet but chose to threaten with war, Germany was bound to accept the Russian view, and when she refused to do so, her “attitude was most alarming!”

The demand was the most preposterous that could be imagined. In the Introduction to the British Blue Book it is said: “At this critical moment everything depended on Germany.” But not the slightest reason is advanced to prove this statement. The author of the Introduction, whoever he be, follows up with the words: “As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, ‘the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin.’” Now this is a repetition of the same phrase but not a proof. Is anything a

truth because a Russian Minister says so?¹ I think that since the time of old Potemkin the augurs themselves would smile at such a suggestion.

We ask again: why did everything depend on Germany? Had Germany threatened anybody? Did she refuse to keep quiet, as Russia did? She only refused to give advice which would be detrimental to Austria, or to exert pressure on her, just because Russia pleased to desire it. Sir Edward Grey says he confessed that he felt helpless. In the Introduction to the Blue Book he or his deputy who wrote it says that "there was no time to advise Russia." Why was there no time for doing so? And if there was not time for England to advise Russia, who had not yet fixed any time-limit or come to a final decision, how could there be time for Germany to advise Aus-

¹In the French Yellow Book the same thing is repeated, of course, over and over again, without ever any reason being given for it.

tria, who had made her final decision and fixed a time-limit from which she could not withdraw without making herself ridiculous? I am afraid Sir Edward will have to answer with Sir John Falstaff: "If reasons were as plenty as blackberries, I would not give a man a reason upon compulsion, I."

It may be important to add just here that Germany, though refusing to "put pressure on the authorities at Vienna"—this was literally asked from her by Sir Edward Grey (cf. Brit. Blue Book No. 112)—nevertheless did her best to influence Austria in the direction desired. She not only forwarded the English propositions to the Austrian Foreign Office, but she also did her utmost to facilitate direct negotiations between the Russian and the Austrian Cabinets; finally the German Emperor appealed to the Czar. The Austrian Red Book contains as No. 44 a note communicated by Count Berchtold to the Aus-

trian Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, Paris and Rome on July 29, informing them of the Austrian Government's being forced to decline, much to its regret, the English propositions forwarded to it by the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky; and under No. 47 a note of Count Szápáry, Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, in which he informs Count Berchtold of conciliatory steps taken by the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. Proof of Germany's earnestness of effort in this direction is afforded not only by the published notes but by a most unimpeachable witness, the Belgian *Chargé d'Affaires* in St. Petersburg, M. d'Escailles, who wrote to his Government on July 30: "It is undeniable that Germany has tried here (in St. Petersburg) as well as in Vienna to find some expedient to avoid a general war."¹

¹Quoted from a letter which was sent by post to the covered address of "Madame Costermans in Brussels" and which, while traversing Germany, was confiscated by the German authorities

The Introduction to the British Blue Book was of necessity written *post festum*. In the notes themselves as collected in the Blue Book this shuffling off of the responsibility from Russia to Germany is evident to all eyes, and all the art employed in arranging them is insufficient to hide it. Some pretext, however, had to be found, an interest of Russia had to be constructed which forced her to interfere. As such an interest did not exist in reality, it had to be founded on a fiction. The fiction was ready at hand. As early as on July 24, Sir Edward Grey had written to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, that "Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia." The same argument is repeated in several English notes during the following days, and—after hostilities had begun. The envelope, being opened, proved to contain a letter to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

if I am not mistaken—it was even brought forth in the English House of Parliament.

Public opinion in Russia! If public opinion had aught to say in Russia, would the present Government, the whole present system of government, exist one day longer? “Russian public opinion” is a mannikin which is put forth whenever the Russian Government chooses not to assume the responsibility of certain acts, but lifeless and utterly unable to ask for anything of its own accord. Whenever real public opinion in Russia dares to utter wishes which displease the Government, the newspaper is suppressed; whenever it dares to lift its voice in meetings, it is trodden down by Cossacks. “Public opinion” in Russia, as quoted by M. Sazónof or by Sir Edward Grey, means newspaper-articles, commanded by the Government or printed by its leave; it is a thing compelled, not a thing compelling. Sir Edward Grey is, of course, not so ignorant that he would

not be aware of this fact; but the average British newspaper-reader is grossly ignorant of the state of foreign countries, and, knowing public opinion to be a real power in his own country, he might easily be made to believe that the Russian Government, however loath to disturb the world's peace, were indeed forced to intercede. Thus the fiction of "Russian public opinion" is used as a means to deceive English public opinion.

There stands, however, behind this fiction an idea, known to all the world and widespread in certain parts of Russian society, an idea that is itself a fiction, a monstrous fiction in European politics. Fictions, as we all know, may be powerful agents in history, and, as their power is based on their being taken for truths, it is time to show that this fiction is but a dangerous sham. It is the fiction of Pan-Slavism, the fiction that Russia is destined by "divine mission" to unite all Slavic nations under her kind and beneficent rule. It

was in the name of the Pan-Slavist idea or fiction that Russia felt herself bound to intercede for Servia. Now, if the Pan-Slavist idea were one of love and brotherhood among all Slavs, it should be welcome. However, the so-called Pan-Slavism is in reality but a euphemistic term for the Pan-Russian idea, Pan-Moskovitism. The Slavic nations who have fallen victim to Russia's divine mission, the Poles, the Ukrainians, have felt this fact with vengeance. Hanging, torturing, banishment, deprivation of all political rights, fiercest oppression, forbidding of their very language and religion, whipping of men and violation of women by hundreds because they would not turn Orthodox, has been the lot of those blessed with Russian Pan-Slavism. Read the English consuls' reports from Poland which have been published. Ask the Poles, the Ukrainians, ask the Russians themselves what they think of their Government. Ask the Poles, the

Circassians, the Georgians, the Fins and whatsoever other nation has undergone the horrible fate of being incorporated in the Russian Empire. Russia protect other Slav states and their independence! Is it not grotesque? Is it not like Medea wishing to adopt other people's children, and alleging the brilliant treatment she gave her own!

Let the Russian Government first free its own subjects from constant oppression and from inflexible suffering before it pretends to liberate other nations! Let the Czar first keep his oath to respect the constitution and independence of Finland, before he dare intercede for the independence of Servia! Let him set free thousands of his own innocent subjects who are dying a slow death in the prisons on the Lake of Ladoga or in the deserts of Siberia before he presumes to protect the ringleaders of the crime that was perpetrated in Sarajewo!

It was by chance that the monstrous treachery which is hiding under the name of the "Divine Mission" of Russia was unveiled to some of its destined victims and to all the world,—as far as it has eyes to see—during the second Balkan War. The Balkan League had been framed, the Balkan War had been instigated by Russian Diplomacy. But when the Russian Government saw that the Bulgarians, one of the favoured nations set free by Russia, were too victorious, that they threatened to become too strong and to conquer, sooner or later, the Turkish Capital whose possession was coveted by Russia herself, it changed its attitude toward them. All the world looked on with astonishment while the Russian protectors delivered the Bulgarians up into the hands of the Servians, their "brethren" and enemies of old, and even into the hands of those races who were the natural enemies of the Slavic race in the Balkans—the Roumanian and the

Greek. They remained passive spectators of the war in which their beloved "brethren" butchered and weakened each other and through which Bulgaria in particular was humbled and deprived of the best part of her conquests. This was the true face of Russian Pan-Slavism. The crime, as crimes so often are, was at the same time a blunder. The Balkan League fell to pieces, and the million of Balkan warriors ceased to number in the calculations of the Triple Entente for the present war. The Bulgarians, betrayed as they were, turned into Austria's and even Turkey's devoted friends.

Of the mixed populations of 48 millions which inhabit Austria-Hungary, about 23 millions belong to the Slavic race. They are more numerous than the inhabitants belonging to any other race. In the Austrian Parliament the members elected by them form the majority. There are always two or three ministers of Slavic nationality

in the Austrian cabinet. The murdered Archduke had married a lady from an old Slavic house. Generals of Slavic blood are leading the Austro-Hungarian armies into battle against the Russians. Even in Hungary where the Slavs form a much smaller percentage of the population and are not so well treated as in Austria, they still enjoy rights surpassing the boldest dreams of those who live under Russian rule. Almost all the Slav peoples in Austria and Hungary may boast of a University where the lectures are given in their own language, where rector, council and professors are of their nationality:—there is a Tschech University in Prague, a Polish University in Krakaw, a Polish and Ruthenian one in Lemberg, a Croatian University in Agram, a Tschech College of Engineering in Brünn, etc.; that they have their own Latin schools and high schools, not to speak of grammar-schools, is a matter of course. No Slavic nation under Rus-

sian rule enjoys the privilege of having a University of her own. At the University of Warsaw, the capital of Poland, all the lectures are given in the Russian language, Polish lectures are strictly forbidden; and the same is the case in all lower schools. Austria might call herself with infinitely more right than Russia, a friend of the Slavic races.

Russian Pan-Slavism is but a cover, a smiling mask for the expansion of the Russian empire, for the rapacious desire of making sooner or later a prey of the other nations around her, while it is a matter of perfect indifference to her whether these nations be Slav or German or Finnish or Chinese.

This constant tendency of the Russian Empire to expand has become a sort of political axiom. And there are writers, there are historians, who have accepted this axiom and who repeat that it

is a necessity for Russia to expand. This proves again that if there is a person bold enough to state with a certain emphasis the most evident falsehood, other people will repeat it, and after a time it will be accepted as a truth of which there is no further need of proof. Is it because she owns the vastest territory with the thinnest population¹ that Russia is forced to expand? Or because in this immense territory there are the vastest stretches of soil not yet cultivated while even those which are devoted to agriculture² are far from being reasonably and thoroughly exploited? Or does it seem needful to expand her Government because her administration is most corrupted, oppressive, and incapable? Is it a reason to expand that she has already rendered so many nations the most unhappy on earth? I

¹ 19 inhabitants to the square kilometer (1.3 in the Asiatic possessions) to 72 in France, 87 in Austria, 120 in Germany.

² 26 per cent. of the whole territory to 35 per cent. in Austria, 46 per cent. in Germany, 48 per cent. in France.

think it is time for a Government like this to withdraw, to wither, but not to expand!

Russia has no real interest at stake in the Balkans. Her commerce with them—import as well as export—is quite insignificant. Her moral or ideal interest in them is a sham. All her interest in the Balkans is to intrigue against Austria and Turkey. It is purely destructive. I may, of course, call it an interest in my neighbour's house when I want to steal it.

In this sense Russia has an interest of old standing in Constantinople and in the Dardanelles; but how much more evident is in that case the interest of Italy in Malta or that of Spain in Gibraltar?

The statesmen of the Triple Entente knew in advance that the Russian standpoint could not be accepted by Austria. The British Ambassador at Vienna wrote to Sir Edward Grey on July 26: "I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both

with me . . . They doubted whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.” (Brit. Blue Book No. 40, p. 26.)

So it was, nor could it be otherwise.

On July 28, Austria declared war on Servia.

It seems that during the next forty-eight hours all the statesmen concerned, the Russian excepted, were in earnest in their wish to “localize” the conflict. A conference of the Powers was suggested, but here again the measures proposed were strangely inconsistent and illogical. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the late Marchese di San Giuliano, made what should seem an excellent proposition; he said that “*he saw no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia*, but he believed that if Servia

would even now accept it, Austria would be satisfied, and if she had reason to think such would be the advice of the Powers, Austria might defer action. Serbia might be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone." (Note of Sir Renell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey of July 27, 1914; Brit. Blue Book No. 57, p. 35.) It is obvious that the Italian statesman would not have made this proposition without having previously made sure of Austria's agreement. It does not seem, however, to have been accepted by the other Powers. Russia did not want a conference to make Serbia give way but to humble Austria. Was it not once more a most preposterous demand, that the great state which had been wronged should be forced to yield to a conference, while the small state which had

wronged and which, being small, had no such "prestige" to lose, should be spared the same? Was it not inevitable that Austria should decline a conference which, as she clearly saw, would be called only to decide against her? How could she accept for herself what Russia would not accept for Servia?

We have stated our belief that, at this moment, the English statesmen were serious in their efforts to preserve peace. We infer this from the fact that, unless they could show that they had done their utmost in that direction, they knew they would have a bad stand in the English Parliament. They had prepared war for years past, they had assembled their fleet at Spithead; still they had reason to think that the present moment was not so favorable for a general war against Germany as a later time might be. That Germany was sincere is proved by the utterances of English statesmen, as contained in the British

Blue Book.¹ All attempts, sincere or not, to preserve peace, were, however, rendered vain by Russia's going on with her mobilisation. Things came to pass exactly as the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, had predicted, when, on July 25, he had "warned the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but probably declare war at once." (British Blue Book No. 17, p. 16.) Germany, by the express terms of the Treaty of Alliance, was bound to defend Austria; nor could she leave the long stretched border of East-Prussia, which is not protected by any fortress, defenceless against a sudden invasion by Russian troops. It was obviously impossible to suffer Russia to mobilise in peace and to wait patiently for the moment when she might be pleased to declare war.

¹ cfr. pp. 25 and 107-8 of this study.

England was informed of this. On July 31, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that in very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor." (British Blue Book No. 108, p. 59.)

Russia, who from the beginning had said that

“if she felt secure of the support of France, she would face all the risks of war,” was now fast driving toward it. On July 29, two days before Sir E. Goschen’s conversation with the German Chancellor, M. Sazónof had written to M. Isvol-skij: “As we are unable to fulfil the wishes of Germany, there is nothing left to us but to arm and to count on war, which is inevitable. Inform French Government of this.” (Russ. Orange Book No. 58.) That Russia, while driving toward war herself, should try to cast the responsibility on Germany—being assisted in this by the Governments and Press of her allies—may be a natural stratagem. But the way in which the Russian Government tried to deceive the German Government concerning her real intentions and attitude was distinctly Oriental in its method.

The German Emperor who had returned from Norway on July 26, sent a telegram to the Czar on July 28, in which he expressed his opinion on

the Servian crime, and represented to the Czar that it was their common interests as sovereigns not to suffer those who were responsible for it to remain unpunished. He assured the Czar that he was using his whole influence in Vienna to come to a peaceful agreement with Russia, and gave expression to the hope that in this he would be assisted by the Czar himself. To this telegram the Czar gave answer on the following day, imploring the German Emperor to help him—"shameful war had been declared on a feeble country"; he would not be able to resist the pressure which was being put on him, and would be forced to take measures which might lead to war. "To prevent such a disaster, I implore you in the name of old friendship to do all that is in your power to prevent your ally from going too far." The Emperor answered on the same day that he could not consider Austria's proceeding shameful; that Servia's promises on paper

had always proved worthless; that the Austrian Cabinet having solemnly declared that it would not aim at territorial aggrandisement at Serbia's expense, Russia might very well remain an on-looker without drawing Europe into the most horrible war which ever had been. His Government was doing its utmost to bring about a direct understanding between Russia and Austria, but such mediation would be made impossible by military measures on Russia's part. Such measures would be apt to hasten a calamity which both monarchs wished to prevent.

The Emperor sent a second telegram on the next day (July 30) which ran thus: "My Ambassador has been instructed to call Your Government's attention to the dangers and the heavy consequences of a mobilisation; I told you the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia and but a part of her army. If Russia mobilises against Austria-

Hungary, as, according to your and your Government's information, is the case, my part as a mediator with which you kindly entrusted me and which I accepted upon your particular wish, will be rendered difficult if not hopeless. The whole grave decision lies now with you—you will be responsible for peace or war. William." To this the Czar answered on the same day, twenty minutes later: "I thank you with all my heart for your ready answer. I am sending Tatitscheff to-night with instructions. The military measures which are now taking place were decided on five days ago but only as a defence against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will in no way influence your mediation, which I appreciate very much. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order to make her come to an agreement with us. Nicolaus."

These five telegrams have been published in the

German White Book as No. 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a. They are carefully left out in the Russian Orange Book.

Was it not deceit of the highest degree for the Czar to send such a telegram—or may we suppose that he was deceived himself and used as a screen by those who wielded the real power—while Russia was already mobilising on every side? Was it not an outrage to say that this was a measure of defence against Austria while Austria had mobilised only a few corps against Serbia? But what is still more noteworthy is that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 that measures had been decided on five days before,—that would be on July 25—while, on July 27, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had telegraphed to the Chancellor: “The War Minister (Suchomlinow) gave his word of honour to the German Military Attaché that no order of mobilisation

had been issued, that no man of the reserve had been called up, not a horse levied!"¹ (German White Book No. 11.)

On the next day, July 31, "danger of war" was proclaimed in Germany, and an ultimatum was despatched to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. A note was also sent to France, demanding within eighteen hours an answer as to whether, in case of war between Germany and Russia, she would remain neutral.

Russia's sole answer was the interruption of the telegraphic communication between the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg and his Government.

¹ How shamelessly Russian officials will say the contrary of manifest truth may be inferred from the following fact: The Russian Ambassador in Switzerland declared in a letter to the "Berner Tageblatt" that no Austrian or German prisoners were being transported to Siberia, while the Russian press was describing the transports and we had letters from our friends, Austrian officers, detained there!

France's answer was: "She would do as her best interests demanded."

Thereupon Germany declared war on Russia in the afternoon of the following day, August 1, and ordered her mobilisation to begin.

IV. A DIGRESSION ON THE BRITISH BLUE BOOK

Before we proceed any further in our exposition of facts, a short digression is necessary on the English official exposition as contained in the Blue Book.

It has been shown how, in the Servian question, when all depended on Russia, the English and Russian diplomats suddenly without any sustainable reason shifted the responsibility on to Germany.

It has been shown that things happened exactly as the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, at the beginning of the crisis, had predicted when he warned the Russian minister "that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once"

(Blue Book No. 17). We may also add, Germany acted exactly as the German Government had announced it would act. For although Herr von Jagow had said, on July 25, that he "had given the Russian Government to understand that the last thing Germany wanted was a general war" (Note by Sir H. Rumbold, Blue Book No. 18), and the Chancellor declared on July 28: "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" (Note by Sir E. Goschen, Blue Book No. 71), still the British Ambassador had been forewarned by von Jagow on July 27, that "if Russia mobilised in the north, Germany would have to do so too, as she had to be very careful not to be taken by surprise" (Note by Sir E. Goschen, Blue Book No. 43). Again on July 30, the urgent warning was sent to the British Government that "beyond the recall of officers on leave the Imperial Government had done nothing special in the way of military preparations; some-

thing would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised, they would have to mobilise on three sides." (Note by Sir E. Goschen, Blue Book No. 98.)

It follows from this that no action could be more coherent and sincere than the German Government's during this crisis. Moreover, it was perfectly in accordance with what Sir G. Buchanan had foretold would be the necessary result of Russia's action. As he had informed his Government of his opinion just as the British diplomats at Berlin had informed it of the utterances quoted above, Sir E. Grey could not be surprised by what was done.

We may add two small but important psychological symptoms: Sir E. Goschen relates that, on July 29, when prospects darkened, he found the German Secretary of State "very depressed" (Bl. B. No. 76); Sir G. Buchanan says on the next day that the German Ambassador in Peters-

burg, Count Pourtalès, "completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable."

Why, if the German Government had been desirous of war, would they have been so unhappy when they saw it must inevitably come? They ought to have exulted at the success of their policy, like M. Iswolskij, who cried out in great glee: "This is my war!"

Remember that the depression of the German statesmen was noticed at a time when they still thought that England might remain neutral!

Yet the author of the Introduction to the British Blue Book dares conclude with the words: "It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this (the Czar's declaration that he had done all in his power to avert war) to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and

Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe."

As the facts spoke too clearly for Germany, something, and even much, had to be done in the way of arrangement to give these words a certain semblance of truth.

To this end it is said (Bl. B., *Introd.*, p. 8, § 6) that "as the result of an offer made by her, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions." To make this piece of news appear still more impressive, it is followed by the words: "For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace." Then the paragraph ends. There is a space of two lines in blank. Then § 7 opens with the "furioso": "At

this moment, on Friday, July 31, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand, etc.”

Now we find here a bold attempt to deceive the reader. The facts as they appear from the documents of the Blue Book are the following: On July 30, the German Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador that he had “asked the Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other place and issue their conditions from here”¹ and that, “if Sir E. Grey could succeed in getting Russia to agree to this basis of an arrangement, and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria, he still saw some chance that European peace might be pre-

¹ King George V had made this Proposition to Prince Henry of Prussia in his telegram of July 30.

served." (Note from Sir E. Goschen, Bl. B. No. 98.) Sir E. Grey immediately informed the Russian Government of this proposal "as a possible relief to the situation," adding in a note to Sir G. Buchanan, that the Russian Ambassador had indeed answered, he feared the condition laid down by M. Sazónof on the same day could not be modified, but that he, Sir Edward Grey, thought a satisfying formula might be found (Bl. B. No. 103). On the next day, July 31, Sir Edward Grey informed Sir G. Buchanan that he had learned with great satisfaction that, "as a result of suggestions by the German Government," discussions were being resumed between Austria and Russia, but that "as regards military preparations, he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia." (Bl. B. No. 110.)

Now, the condition laid down by M. Sazónof

on the 30th and slightly altered by him in a way suggested by the British Minister on the 31st, was but a repetition of Russia's old demand that Austria should allow a conference of the Powers to decide between her and Servia. But, although Austria, "as a result of suggestions by German Government," declared herself ready to reassume direct discussions with Russia, she positively refused to stop the march of her troops or to submit to an intervention of the Powers, and it was that which Russia had asked from her, if she was to stop her own preparations (Bl. B. No. 97 and 113). In the telegram referred to in the introduction—it can but be No. 120 of the Blue Book, being the only telegram sent from Russia on the 31st, in which her magnanimous offer is mentioned—not a word is said of Austria's acceptance of it!

In the Introduction Austria's readiness for direct discussion—which discussion was declared

useless by Russia unless Austria consented to stop the march of her troops—is artfully mentioned in a way to make the reader believe that she had at last accepted the Russian formula which until then had always been flatly declined by her.

There is reprinted in the Blue Book—as No. 133—a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen which runs thus:

“Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. de Etter—Counsellor of the Russian Embassy in London—came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated July 31, which are as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discus-

sions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

Now if this telegram be the one meant in the Introduction, we are forced to state that, according to Sir E. Grey's own words, it was communicated to him only on August 1, and could therefore give him no hope on July 31, the day on which Germany despatched her ultimatum.

Besides, according to this note, it *was not the Austrian Ambassador, but M. Sazónof* who declared it "desirable that the Great Powers should participate in the discussions, and that these should take place in London."

Here again Austria is ready for direct discussion while Russia wanted the conference. And it is quite clear that Austria was ready for discussion in general but not willing to discuss her demands on Servia. In a telegram from Peters-

burg of the same day Sir G. Buchanan states that the Austrian Ambassador had no "definite instructions" from his Government and diverted the conversation into a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, while the Russian Minister tried to speak on Serbia.

Lastly we find in the Blue Book reproduced as No. 161 a letter addressed to Sir Edward Grey by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, former British Ambassador at Vienna, dated from London, September 1. In this letter Sir Maurice declares to have been informed by M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, on August 1, that Count Szápáry, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, "had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M.

Sazónof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal *on condition that Austria would refrain from actual invasion of Serbia*. Austria in fact had finally yielded. . . .”¹

This seeming corroboration of the statement in the Introduction is perfectly worthless, as the condition stipulated by M. Sazónof was not accepted. Here again we find that it is the Russian Ambassador who informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen of Austria's intentions. Why did the latter omit asking the Austrian Government for information concerning so important a point? Sir M. de Bunsen himself adds: “Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter *could probably have been settled* by negotiation, and M.

¹ The instructions given to the Austrian Ambassador have since been published in the Austrian Red Book as No. 49 and 50. The reader will find them on pp. 193 and 194 of this study: they contain just the opposite of what Sir Edward Grey asserts they contained.

Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise." This, of course, is mere idle talk, especially in such a moment and in such a situation, and it is really hard to believe that on August 1, the day on which war had been declared, the Russian Ambassador should have had leisure to indulge in such hollow generalities, unless—they were spoken because he was requested to speak them. In so far as de Bunsen's account contains the intimation that Austria had been ready to submit to the pretensions of the Russian Government, it is in flat contradiction to the telegrams of the time. The fact has also since been declared untrue and even "unthinkable" by the Austrian Foreign Office. I am afraid that this piece, made up a month after the events, is but a further attempt "to trouble what is clear" and to make things appear as if the good dispositions of peaceful Russia and yielding Austria had been wantonly interrupted by Ger-

many. It almost seems that the Austrian offer was purposely misrepresented by M. Sazonof and purposely misunderstood by the English statesmen.¹

It is not only an untruth that the two eastern Powers were well disposed—for neither did Austria intend to give way in Servia nor did Russia want peace—but further it is untrue that Germany despatched her ultimatum suddenly on that very day, “out of nervousness” as is ironically suggested in the Introduction.² The British Ambassador had had fair warning on the day before that “something would have to be done” unless Russia stopped her warlike preparations, and he was again informed on the next day that “in a very short time, perhaps to-day, the German Government would take a very serious step.”

¹ See the treatment of the same question in the French Yellow Book in App. II, pp. 189-203 of this study.

² As to how the declaration of war actually came about see pp. 100-104.

(Bl. B. No. 108.) And this step was taken because Russian mobilisation continued in a threatening manner. Russia's mobilisation was a reality which had to be faced, her formulas were words. She would have offered much more pleasant formulas than the unacceptable one discussed above and M. Schebeko would have added as many kind and hopeful words as one might wish, on condition that Russia would be allowed to assemble her immense armies undisturbed by Germany. But Germany could not leave her border undefended for a formula's sake.

In the Introduction as well as in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's letter a vain attempt is made to turn things upside down, and the method is almost as unfortunate as that adopted by the "Times," which wrote on July 29, "Germany has behaved very well, but she is being dragged at the heels of the Austrian war-chariot," and on October 27, upon better thoughts: "The wretched Dual

Monarchy is being dragged at the heels of the Prussian war-chariot!"

We are sorry to say that we have to adduce still more unpleasant proofs of "arrangement" in the British official publication.

War with Russia meant most likely war with France. For this Germany and Austria were prepared, although they asked France, as a matter of course, whether she would remain neutral.

In order, however, to prove Germany's alleged aggressiveness even on the French side, strange documents are brought forth.

With a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, of July 30 (Bl. B. No. 105), there are printed three enclosures: No. 1 and 2, the two letters of November, 1912, which contained the famous "agreement" on military co-operation between France and England; the third a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the

French Ambassador at London, M. Paul Cambon, in which the Minister complains of German offensive acts on the French frontier. The French Minister's telegram bears the date "Paris, July 31." How could it be sent enclosed in a despatch from London of the 30th?

But what is still more astonishing, the text of the French note begins with the words: "*L'armée allemande a ses avantpostes sur nos bornes frontières; Vendredi, hier, par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire.*" "The German army has its advanced posts on our frontier posts; Friday, yesterday, German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory."

Notice, please: Friday, *Vendredi*, was July 31.

According to this, the telegram was sent on August 1! and the date must have been changed—most awkwardly changed—into July 31!

In the second edition of the Blue Book, the contradiction having probably been noticed, the

date of the telegram is simply left out, but not a word is offered in explanation of so strange a fact!

The text, too, is altered in the second edition, the word "*Vendredi*—Friday" being left out in the French text as well as in the English version of it!

What are we to infer from all this?

But there is more. In the French note it is said further: "*J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi, le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.*" "I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in."

Now the Austrian note was not handed in on Saturday the 25th, but on Thursday 23, while the Servian reply was given on Saturday 25.

There again, in the second edition of the Blue

Book, the actual dates of the Austrian ultimatum and the Servian reply are given in a footnote, and it is added that the latter document is the one being referred to in the text.

The whole passage is an awkward and blundering invention to make the reader believe that Germany had concocted the Ultimatum to Servia together with Austria as a means to have war, and had begun preparation at once.

What are we to conclude? Shall we believe that the "nervous Frenchman" who wrote out the despatch made so many blunders in one note? The fact remains that two different texts being given in the two editions of the Blue Book, the documents have most certainly been altered. And this fact is scarcely of a nature to enhance confidence in the British official publication.¹

What a change has taken place in British diplomacy since the days of Disraeli and Gladstone!

¹ See further particulars on the altered note in Append. II, "The French Yellow Book," on pp. 203-207 of this study.

V. THE CRISIS.

ENGLAND AND THE BELGIAN QUESTION

On August 1 war between Germany and Russia was declared. War between Austria and Russia on the one hand, between France and Germany on the other hand, seemed inevitable.

On this same day, August 1, the German Chancellor received a telegram from the German Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, in which the latter informed him of the fact that Sir E. Grey had just asked by telephone—Sir Edward Grey was careful not to put it down in writing—whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would refrain from attacking her. Hereupon the Emperor himself telegraphed at once to the King of England:

"If France offers her neutrality, which should be guaranteed by the British army and navy, I shall of course desist from an attack on France and shall dispose of my troops in a different way. I hope France will not become nervous. I am herewith giving the order by telephone and by telegraph that the troops at my frontier be kept from crossing the border. Wilhelm." It is natural that the German Government should have asked this guaranty from England, as the offer came from England.

Without further delay, a telegraphic answer came from the King of Great Britain in which the whole was declared to be a "misunderstanding." Now, misunderstanding or not, the incident gives final conclusive proof that Germany was far from wishing war with France, and far from having aggressive intentions.

Whatever may have been the nature of the "misunderstanding," it was, of course, extremely improbable, considering the nature of the Franco-Russian Alliance, that France would or even

could remain neutral,—France who so long had nourished the desire of revenge and who for years had been paying Russia for future services in that direction. M. Cambon had stated this very clearly on July 29 (Blue Book No. 87).

During the crisis the English Government had been repeatedly urged by Russia and France to announce that it would stand by them in any emergency—"then there would be no war." As late as July 30, the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that "peace between the Powers was in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present difference between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude." (Notes from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey of July 25 and 27, from Sir Edward

Grey to Sir G. Buchanan of July 27, and from Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey of July 30, Blue Book No. 17, 44, 47, 99; Note from M. Jules Cambon to M. Bienvenu-Martin of July 25, Yellow Book No. 47.¹

The mere thought that Germany or Austria could be intimidated into submission goes but to show how little real understanding Russia and France had of their two near neighbours.

English statesmen knew better, and the answer which they gave to their friends was a warning that "the German Government's attitude would only be stiffened by such a menace while their own part as mediators would be rendered more difficult." At the same time they gave them to understand that "England, if her counsels of

¹ M. Cambon, being, as a Frenchman, particularly imaginative, even goes so far as to believe that fear of England's joining in the war contributed to make Germany postpone her mobilisation which, as he strongly *suspects*, had already been decided on in Potsdam on July 29. (Note of July 30, Yellow Book No. 105.)

moderation were disregarded, might be converted into an ally," and further that "the impression that England would stand aside in case of war, ought to be dispelled by the orders given to the First Fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave." (Bl. B. No. 17, 44, and 47.)

The explanation of this attitude of the British Government has been given in Chapter II on pp. 33-34.

"Agreements" for future military and naval co-operation had been made or prepared not only with France and Russia but even—this was still a secret—with neutral Belgium as well. Although at the time when the Anglo-French agreement had been concluded, Sir Edward Grey, in his letter to M. Cambon, expressly stated that the "disposition of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment—that is to say November 1912—was not based upon an en-

gagement to co-operate in war" things were very different now. In fact not only the First Fleet "happened to be concentrated at Portland," but almost the whole English Fleet happened to be concentrated in the North Sea, and the whole French Fleet in the Mediterranean. Though the British statesmen did not, perhaps, find the present moment as favourable for a general war as a later moment might have been, they were perfectly decided not to stand aside, but to join with France and Russia and as many of their allies as could be found, in order to profit by the occasion and crush Germany. The only question was to find a reason sufficient to inveigle English public opinion. On the whole their policy was but the continuation of the old English policy of fighting down the strongest continental state with the help of continental allies. They knew that they could count on a party who thought like them, "*Germaniam esse delendam.*" Among themselves they

took no care to hide their thoughts, and whoever knows how to read between the lines of smooth and cautious diplomatic language will understand what it meant when Sir G. Buchanan on July 24 said in St. Petersburg: "Direct British interests in Servia are nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion"; or again when Sir Edward Grey said to the Russian Ambassador in London, on July 27, that the "impression that England would at any event stand aside ought to be dispelled by the orders given to the first fleet" though he added, of course, that "his reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised." No more could be "promised," but much more could be done, and very much could be implied. The acting French Minister of Foreign Affairs understood this perfectly, when he expressed himself "grateful for the communication of this promise and quite

appreciated the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves solidaires with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England." (Bl. B. No. 6, 47, 62.) This was on the 28th. On the 29th M. Paul Cambon, when Sir E. Grey had explained his attitude to him, likewise gave answer that "he understood it to be a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what was necessary for us to do." M. Cambon, as Sir Edward Grey added, "seemed quite prepared for this announcement and made no criticism on it." He took, however, care to state that "France was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked." (Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Bertie. Bl. B. No. 87.)

On July 31, Sir Edward Grey took pains to reassure the French Government, through his Ambassador, by saying "Nobody here feels that in this dispute, as far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved" . . . and adding in the same breath: "German Government do not expect our neutrality." "We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war," said he, and when the French Ambassador urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision, he explained his words by the important comment: "We should not be justified in giving any pledge to intervene at the present moment, but we will certainly consider the situation directly there is a new development." Again, on the same day, he gives vent to the still more expressive sentence: "Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view

that intervention is justified." (Bl. B. No. 116, 119.)

The words "in the present condition," "as far as the dispute has yet gone," "at the present moment," "further developments might alter the situation," and the like return in every message, and they were essential. Nor were they misunderstood. They covered the Foreign Secretary perfectly, and at the same time gave to the hearer very solid hopes. Sir Edward Grey possessed the consummate art of saying very much while he did not seem to say anything. His "dance between two rows of eggs" was in a way a splendid performance.

No promise was given, no agreement bound the English nation, yet her allies knew they could count on her. Peace had been mediated on every side with the most honest face and the best words in the world, yet war was being prepared in the most fearful and inevitable way. Truth

had been spoken to everybody, and yet he was deceiving his own country and the world at large. Even to Germany he had given so polite and friendly warning at the right moment that she could not complain or at least ought not to do so (see Blue Book No. 85 and 89).

The fact is, Sir Edward Grey waited for the "new development," perfectly sure to find it. He had it ready in his pocket for full two years and sprang it on the 31st,—not on his Parliament, but on Germany.

He asked the French and the German Government in two telegrams of identical tenor whether "they would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it."

The telegram to France was naturally sent only for appearance's sake, as the two allies were working in perfect harmony.

Germany declined to give an immediate answer, because by doing so she would have be-

trayed her military plans—but desired to know first, through her Ambassador in England, Prince Lichnowsky, whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would engage to remain neutral. Sir E. Grey replied that he could not say that, he did not think that he could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

Two days before, the German Chancellor, in exchange for British neutrality, had offered the pledge of the Government not to take any French territory in Europe in case of victory. Sir Edward Grey had answered indignantly—but why indignantly—it would be “a disgrace for England to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.” It was offered, moreover, that the German fleet would abstain from attacking the French coast in the channel; but this was considered as being

equally insufficient. Why was this a bargain at the expense of France?

So Prince Lichnowsky "pressed" the Foreign Secretary to formulate his conditions himself. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

Sir E. Grey, hard pressed, answered that he felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on such terms; he could only say: "We must keep our hands free." (Bl. B. No. 123.)¹

Now on what terms would Sir E. Grey have engaged to remain neutral?

¹ No. 123.—Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

Sir: I TOLD the German Ambassador today that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other

There is as far as England is concerned, perhaps no more important document in the whole Blue Book than this telegram No. 123, and the evidence it contains is rendered still more precious by its being written—not telephoned as in the case of his offer of French neutrality¹—by Sir Edward Grey, so that he cannot even say

respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

¹ See page 124.

that he was misunderstood. His resolution not to remain neutral on any account had long since been taken, but the "moral drapery," the theatrical pretext for onlookers were still missing. Further proof of his resolution not to remain neutral is to be found in the letter, dated July 30, of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, M. de l'Escaille (already quoted in Part III on p. 81), in which is stated "the Russian Government have the promise that England will assist France."

✓ Sir Edward Grey's seemingly superfluous question as to whether France and Germany were ready to engage to respect Belgium's neutrality was necessary for the purpose of imposing on English and foreign public opinion. As he himself said to Prince Lichnowsky: "Our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here." He

would have been in great perplexity if Germany against all expectation had engaged to respect it. He knew, however, that this was impossible, and that he could be quite sure of the game he was playing.

In order to understand this question of the neutrality of Belgium, it is necessary to consider the military and the political situation, respectively, of Germany and Belgium. And in order to be fair, we shall take an Englishman's view of it, the view of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, the well-known military writer, who in the "London Magazine" of May, 1912, published a most interesting article, entitled "In Case of War." In this article he states, as we stated before on p. 20, that the situation of Germany's western frontier is favorable only to France, the Vosges Mountains being a natural bulwark; while behind them the formidable line of fortresses from Verdun to Belfort is such that the German offensive must

either break to pieces before it or at the very most only be able to force it with terrible losses of men and fatal loss of time. The present war has well proved the truth of this assertion. While Germany lies almost open to French inroads, there is small chance for a German attack on France. Not so well protected by far is the French frontier towards Belgium. There are no fortresses of great worth on this line. Here and here alone would France be open to a German invasion. But neutral Belgium lies between the two countries, and, what is still more important, neutral Belgium is excellently fortified on the German side. Mr. Belloc says literally (on p. 283): "The French strategic frontier does not correspond to their political frontier on the North" and again on p. 286: "The real strategic frontier of France is the Meuse river."

Given this situation, Germany would, of course be compelled to attack France through Belgium.

“Let us take it as our starting point,” says Mr. Belloc on pp. 284-5, “that the Germans would and *must* try to get across the Meuse at Liège.”

It may seem unimportant that Mr. Belloc says further that it would be “a woeful miscalculation” to consider the capture and occupation of a fortress like Liège as “the matter of a few hours or even of a few days,” “calculations based upon rushing its defence are calculations of defeat.” We pardon Mr. Belloc for not knowing German valour and German energy. Unimportant likewise may seem the measures which, according to Mr. Belloc, are incumbent on England to assist Belgium against Germany, and also his theory that “Antwerp, so long as Germany does not control the sea, can be made the secure base of an ever increasing force.” All of this is unimportant. What is of real significance to us is that the English military authority himself states that Germany had no choice but to go at France

through Belgium. He adds, of course, in passing, that this would not have to be feared "if treaties were held sacred by the Government of Berlin" and that it "would be an abominably wrong and treacherous action"; but this is just a slight bow to that hypocrisy which is common in politics, the main import of which can be expressed in the sentence: "I may do wrong for my country, but you may not for yours." The sacredness of the treaty does not interest him so very much, after all, as he devotes only two lines to the moral, and many pages to the military side of the question.

Germany had indeed no choice. On one side she had immense Russia threatening an open borderline; on the other side France, who, while being protected from an attack, could easily carry the war into the German provinces. Germany was certainly lost if she hesitated to take the way which the English author had told her two years

before she must try. How would the general or the statesman be treated in England who reported: "I am sorry to say, Great Britain is lost; it is true, I might have saved her by marching across neutral territory, but I have always been told that I was not to do that, and my countrymen, who are exceedingly severe and even inexorable on the point of morals, would never have pardoned me for saving them in that way." Sir Edward Grey, I have no doubt, would have clapped him on his back as being the man of his ethics, and he would have been carried in triumph through the London streets. The world seems to have lost sight of the fact that not all of Britain's great men, not even all of her Parliament, believed that Germany's proposal to march through Belgium was Sir Edward Grey's real reason for entering the war. Meetings of protest were held by leading men. Lord Morley, Burns and Trevelyan resigned from office. Mr. Ramsay Mac-

donald, M. P., answered Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 in the following words: "I think the Government which the right honourable gentleman represents and for which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong. . . . If the right honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him. What is the use of talking about coming to the aid of Belgium when, as a matter of fact, you are engaging in a whole European war which is not going to leave the map of Europe in the position it is in now? The right honourable gentleman said nothing about Russia. We will want to know about that. We want to try to find out what is going to happen when it is all over to the power of Russia in Europe and we are not going blindly into this

conflict without having some sort of a rough idea as to what is going to happen."

Another member of Parliament, Mr. Ponsonby, in the thirteen questions published by him in the "Nation" answered to Qu. 4: "Would we have declared war on France, if in the interest of her security, she would have found it necessary to send a French army across the Belgian frontier?" "No!"

But another still more important answer was given in a most unexpected way. In the war-office in Brussels most interesting papers were found, among them a report of General Ducarme, dated Brussels, April 10, 1906, and addressed to the Belgian War-Minister, relating to a conversation he had had with the English Military Attaché Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. The subject of the conversation had been the landing of British troops in Belgium in case of a German attack on the country. In this conversation and consequent upon

it in the report, everything is considered: what forces would be landed—100,000 men—and of what troops they would consist; the landing-place, which ought to be Dunkirk, because Antwerp would take much more time; the railway-transport from there, and the time required for the transport. It was further suggested that maps should be prepared for the English officers, and pictures representing the Belgian uniforms, as well as translations of certain Belgian military instructions; also Belgian staff-officers should be appointed to accompany the single British corps, etc. There is a note to the report, in which is added that the English General Grierson had informed General Ducarme, at the manœuvres, that even 150,000 men could be landed. Of course, the well-known formula is not missing “that the English Government should not be bound by the agreement,” and on the margin is

written: "*L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne*" ("the English would not enter Belgium before the violation of our neutrality through Germany").

A few years later, however, a new conference having taken place between the English Military Attaché and the Belgian General Jungbluth, a new report was written. The paper is dated April 23 only, no year being given, but it is to be inferred from the contents that it must be 1911 or 1912—. The report was made by Count Van der Straaten of the Belgian Foreign Office. According to this document, England, "during the late events," as Col. Bridges informed General Jungbluth, would have sent over 160,000 men, and on the Belgian General's protest that Belgian consent would first be necessary for that, the Englishman replied that he was aware of this, but that, knowing Belgium to be incapable of re-

elling the German attack, England would have landed her army in any case.¹

It must also be added that in the pockets of English officers, killed or taken prisoners during the present war, not only detailed maps of Belgium have been found, but elaborate military informations concerning Belgium in English translation, such as could only be furnished by the Belgian General Staff and which required a long time to be prepared. On each copy the words "Property of the Crown" were printed, with severe injunctions of secrecy to the responsible possessor of the same.

Moreover, important papers were found in the possession of the Secretary of the English Embassy at Brussels, Mr. Grant Watson, who had

¹ Compare the words of the German ultimatum: "The Imperial Government are afraid that Belgium in spite of the best intentions will be unable to repel a march of French forces. . . . Germany is forced by measures of her enemies to violate Belgian territory. . . ." (Belg. Gray Book No. 20.)

remained there and was arrested by the German troops. Among them were secret informations concerning Belgian mobilisation, the defence of Antwerp and its provisions, dated May 27, 1913; also a piece of paper on which was written by hand:

“Renseignements:

1. *Les officiers français ont reçu ordre de rejoindre dès le 27 après-midi:*
2. *Le même jour, le chef de Gare de Feignies a reçu ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermés disponibles, en vue de transports de troupes.*

*Communiqué par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.”*¹

Now, Feignies is a railway station in France 3 km. from the Belgian frontier, while Frameries is a station of the same line in Belgium, about 10 km. from the borderline. This meant active as-

¹ All these documents have been reproduced by order of the German Government, and the facsimiles have been communicated to the Governments of neutral states.

sistance given to the French Mobilisation on July 27, 1914—that is to say, six days before the delivery of the German ultimatum. The papers were confiscated just as Mr. Grant Watson tried to destroy them.

There we find the neutral State of Belgium granting to one neighbour the permission to march through its territory, furnishing maps and transcriptions of its most jealously guarded military secrets to one side and to one side only, the Allies.¹

Let us suppose things had taken the other

¹Belgium had not been without timely warning. Her own Ambassador at the court of Berlin, Baron Greindl, had admonished the Belgian Government to beware of making one-sided agreements with the Triple-Entente. He even went to the length of calling the English propositions "naïve and perfidious." Yet, in full consciousness of all these facts, the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Davignon, dared declare in a note addressed to the German Ambassador, Herr von Below-Saleske, on Aug. 3, 1914 (Belgian Gray Book No. 22): "Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality," and he repeated these words in a note addressed to the heads of Belgian Embassies in all foreign countries on Aug. 5. (Belgian Gray Book, No. 44.)

course, let us suppose for a moment that the Belgian Government had made the same agreements with Germany, fearing France and her intentions. It may be well to remind the reader of the fact that Belgium had been afraid of French Politics for many years and of more than a mere march of troops through Belgian territory. (In 1867 France desired to incorporate Belgium in France and proposed to Prussia that she should take Holland.) Let us suppose that this state of things had lasted and that the agreements had been made with Germany: will anybody believe that England and France would have been satisfied, that they would have declared in Brussels: "Provided that you take care to add that all your arrangements with Germany are made for the protection of your neutrality and for the prevention of violations of it, they are all right. Your 'conversations' with the German military attaché may be ever so explicit, they may touch

every detail of the future inroad of German troops; your attitude is correct and not in contradiction with your international obligations.” Does anybody believe that this would have been the attitude of the French and English Governments? Let us suppose further that the Belgian Government had been compelled by the German Government to make military preparations on the French border, what would French and English statesmen have said?

All this was done—but the other way round! The arrangements were made with England, the preparations were against Germany. The proof is to be found in an article which was written by a well-known member of the Belgian Parliament, M. Louis de Brouckère and published by him in the “Neue Zeit” of July, 1914, No. 18, just a few days before the war broke out:

“Only a few days after the elections (of 1912) the (Belgian) Government obeyed the urgent

admonitions of France, England and, undoubtedly, Russia, and M. de Brocqueville brought a bill before the Chamber introducing Compulsory Service. . . . Our field force has been increased to 150,000 men by order of the Triple-Entente which has installed itself as protector of our possessions. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, who considers Compulsory Service to be an onerous institution only within her own borders, will again ask us to fulfill our obligations. . . . We must dance to the pipe of France and England, dance even to our death."

Prophetic words, destined to be realised only too soon! Nobody could express in clearer terms on which side and on whose behalf the Belgian Government was making its military preparations. Now consider all elements together: Belgium, by her very situation, forms the strategic frontier of England and France, her fortresses were considered England's and

France's defences; they played an important part in their strategic plans; her government had made arrangements with both in order to make her position still more effective in their favour and against Germany, while no arrangements had been made with Germany against a possible French or English inroad; at the wish of the Triple-Entente, Belgium had increased her field force and fortified her defences against Germany; the sympathies of the public and of the press were all for France: what more, please, could have been done against the spirit and the letter of Belgian neutrality?

Germany did not desire to take Belgian territory nor to touch Belgium's independence; twice she offered peace and perfect restoration for damages after the war. She only wanted to march through Belgium.¹

In the face of these facts, hear Mr. Asquith

¹ See the German ultimatum in Appendix I.

declaiming in Parliament on August 6, 1914. "What does that—the German proposal—amount to? Let me just ask the house. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passions, certainly not with the object of exciting feelings against Germany ["O masters, if I were disposed to stir—your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,—I should do Brutus wrong"], but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free license to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal

to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given

by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees."

Must not these words have sounded fine and pathetic in the ears of the hearers who were ignorant of the monstrous comedy that preceded and which culminated in the two telegrams of July 31?

It is only in Mr. Asquith's last sentence, where he says that the country's honour as well as its interest required the war, and only in the latter half of this last sentence that a ray of truth breaks through his statements.

In this firm of "Honour and Interest" which, according to Mr. Asquith, determined the Eng-

lish Cabinet's action, Honour is a very insignificant person with a fine appearance, who is sent forth to represent the house whenever his partner thinks fit to do so, but who is at once silenced and shut up in a back-room when his views do not happen to be in accordance with those of the shrewd business-man who is the real head of the house, and who reserves the management of it absolutely to himself.

Politicians, of course, are often forced to hide their thoughts, but seldom does one find a great statesman resorting to such "cant" as Mr. Asquith has done.

England's honour implicated by the observation of neutrality or the violation of treaties she has put her name to! In how many treaties, since 1878, has Great Britain pledged her faith as a guarantee of the integrity of Turkish territory? Yet, in spite of so many solemn promises, she did not feel herself bound to keep "her

plighted word" in 1912, but delivered the Ottoman Empire, a friendly Power, up to the Balkan League. Nor did Mr. Asquith's Cabinet then abhor the bartering away of their obligations behind a friendly Power's back.

In 1807, in time of peace, the British bombarded the neutral Port of Copenhagen and took possession of the entire Danish fleet.

But in 1914 Mr. Asquith continued: "If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered in between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and fac-

tor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." Thus speaks the Prime-Minister of the British Empire, which is strong, overmastering numberless small nations powerless to resist her! Did he never for a moment think of Egypt, of the Boer Republics in 1904, of Southern Persia, of North Persia delivered up to Russia and trodden down by her with greatest brutality? Were they not small nations crushed by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power? Why if so desirous "to vindicate the principle," did the English Government never fight for oppressed countries like Finland or Poland, the Baltic provinces, the Ruthenians?

All the world knows why England made war

on Germany and "what she is fighting for." To begin with, England believed that she was taking no risk. To quote from Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 (Blue Book, Part II [1])—we hope that speech may ever be remembered—"For us, with a powerful Fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce and to protect our shores, and to protect our interests if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer if we stand aside."

England's great fear was the growth of German commerce. In the time between 1901 and 1911 German commerce had grown from 7.3 to 17.6 milliards of Marks, that is to say, increased by 10 milliards or by 141%.

English Commerce in the same period had grown from 12.7 to 21.1 milliards, that is to say, increased by 8.4 milliards or by 66%.

It is clear that in a given period German Com-

merce, if allowed to grow unimpaired, will not only proportionately but also absolutely become superior to British Commerce.

From 1897 to 1911 the German merchant marine increased from 3,256,000 to 7,884,000 reg. tons, that is to say, by 192%; the English merchant marine in the same time increased from 22,507,000 to 33,864,000 reg. tons, that is to say, by 59%.

From 1897 to 1911 the percentage of the world's ships, which is represented by the German merchant marine, rose from 6.5 to 9.9, that is to say, 3%, while the percentage represented by the English merchant marine decreased from 54.3 to 47.4, that is 7%.

These and a series of similar figures contain the true reason of England's war against Germany. Regarding this point, however, Mr. Asquith said nothing. The fact has since been con-

fessed with all commendable openness by British statesmen as well as by the British press.¹

Now it seems permissible to combat, nay to ruin, a commercial competitor by commercial means, but not by burning his house or by an attempt on his life; and it seems particularly contemptible to make this attempt on his life by "striking him from behind while he is fighting for his life against two assailants." This is what England has done, and it is what in Germany has caused the sudden and terrible hatred of the English, of Sir Edward Grey, of Asquith. The high esteem that up to the war existed for England exists now only for those few great British minds which have kept their impartial view of the entangled matters of this world.

¹In a long article on Iron and Steel Industry in Germany and England in the "Engineer" (Aug. 28 to Sept. 25) it is said: "The end of the war must be the *methodical ruin* of all great industrial establishments in the German provinces occupied by the allied troops."

While the Germans fight for their country, for their homes, for their existence, England, threatened by no one in her existence, made war for her mercantile interests, for her money's sake. The Germans knew against what odds and for what a price they were to contend, while for England it has been a question of the merest expediency.

There is still another reason for our disappointment. The Germans admired England. Ever since the first half of the nineteenth century they believed her to be the birthplace as well as the patron of political liberty. Some of them, deceived by outward show, and some, by the existence of many Englishmen whose views are most enlightened, whose moral standard is very high, deceived by these things, I say, some of them believed in a higher English civilisation. And man hates to be deceived in what he thought an ideal, and more than an enemy he hates the

friend who has betrayed his belief in him. Evidence of the very friendly attitude of the German people towards England and the English we find in the utterance of no less a witness than Lord Aspley, who returned to London on August 2 after a two months' sojourn in the German Empire. The "Morning Post" of August 4 relates the following: "Asked as to the attitude of the German people towards England and the English, he said that his experience had been that they were friendly rather than otherwise. From the conversations he had had with different people, they seemed to exclude England from the quarrel altogether, and seemed to regard her as a country that would have no hand in the matter at all. One and all seemed deeply appreciative of England's efforts for peace, and spoke in the highest terms of Sir Edward Grey."

The Germans can pardon France, though she is wronging herself and them, because they can

at least conceive her hatred of them since 1871. They can understand that a barbarian and despotic Empire like Russia, which thought itself the master of the continent, annoyed at finding a highly organized smaller Power in its way, rushes upon it to destroy it. But they cannot pardon the people and party led by the diplomats of England, with whom they never had any war or even a quarrel, for treacherously coming in to help the destroyers.

Indications of the feelings of the best Englishmen were not wanting, however. A meeting of prominent men declared during the most critical time that a war against Germany would be "a war against civilization." We are not to forget either that England was the sole country where three ministers resigned because they were not willing to assume the responsibility for this war. We see that a high standard of political morals

is by no means extinct in England, and that there are men left whose views coincide with those of Germany. Unhappily they seem to have no influence on the politics of their country.

What remains? This war is no more a war of races than it is one of principles. What M. Cambon said of a struggle between Teuton and Slav is but fiction. There are 25 millions of Slavs, the strong men of which are actually fighting with Germany and Austria. There are 40 millions more (Poles, Bulgarians, Ukrainians) sympathizing with them. The number of Slavs who are for them is at least as large as the number of those against them. It is not a war of nations. The French, the English and the Russian peoples had as little wish for a war with the Central Powers as their people ever had to fight against them. It is, as a Spanish scholar

said lately, a kind of civil war. It is a war created by the envy, ambition and low interest of a small number of persons who deluded themselves and deceived the many. The interest and illusions of a few ambitious French politicians who made the fatal alliance with Russia, precipitated their unfortunate country into a war created out of reckless ambition by a few Russian Granddukes and their adherents. Only irresponsible and merciless politicians like those who wield the power in Russia could let loose the horrors of such a war. No responsible statesman would ever have dared to do it. But France was forced to join and, seeing she could not do otherwise, tried to comfort herself morally with the hope that the moment of great revenge was near. England, who had engineered the dangerous diplomatic situation, joined, to profit by the occasion, for her commercial interest.

Germany is fighting to preserve that which she has achieved, while England is fighting not for her achievements but against them.

The consequences will fall heavily on England and on all the world.

APPENDIX I

THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM

Note handed by Herr von Below-Saleske, German Ambassador, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 2 o'clock p. m. of August 2, 1914.

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

The German Government have sure information that French troops intend to march along the Meuse river by Givet and Namur. This news renders all further doubt as to the intention of France to march on Germany through Belgian territory impossible. The Imperial Government are afraid that Belgium in spite of the best intentions will be unable to repel a march of French forces of that strength. The fact constitutes a sufficient certainty of an imminent danger to Germany.

It is Germany's imperious duty to prevent such an attack on the enemy's part.

The German Government would deeply regret,

if Belgium should see in the fact that Germany is forced by measures of her enemies to violate Belgian territory, an act of hostility toward herself.

In order to exclude all misunderstandings, the German Government declare:

I. Germany intends no hostile act toward Belgium. If in the war which is beginning, Belgium consents to observe an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government engage to guarantee the existence of the Kingdom and all its possessions for the time of peace.

II. On the same condition Germany engages to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is restored.

III. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is ready to buy and to pay cash—by concert with the Belgian authorities—for everything that is necessary to the German troops, and to pay damages for all detriment caused by them.

IV. If Belgium should commit hostile acts against the German troops, if she should—in par-

ticular—oppose difficulties to their advance, be it by means of the fortifications on the Meuse river, be it by destroying roads, railway lines, tunnels, and other works of the kind, Germany will be forced to consider Belgium as a hostile power.

In this case Germany will assume no engagements toward the Kingdom but will leave all future relations between the two states to the decision of arms. The German Government entertain the just hope that such a contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will apply all appropriate measures to prevent it. In this case the friendly relations existing between the two states will become still more close and durable. (Belgian Gray Book No. 20.)

APPENDIX II

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

The French official publication is not nearly so clever as the British Blue Book. The Blue Book deals at least with facts, though they be often arranged and misrepresented with great cunning, while the French publications deal mostly with conjectures. Misrepresentation and, we are afraid, forgery is sometimes attempted, but with so little skill that to all readers who have even a slight knowledge of the facts in question, the blunder is at once discernible. We would be inclined to speak of French superficiality, if we did not know the wonderful and most exact works of French historians which forbid generalisations of this kind. But is it possible that French statesmen who have lived in Germany for a long time and are known to be able

men, should be so absolutely incapable of judging facts, persons, public opinion in Germany? Is it because they have always acted and judged according to a settled prejudice? or did they intentionally misrepresent events because they did not desire friendly relations between the two nations? Did they intend to delude the French reader or were they the dupes of their own ignorance? How could they allow unconscientious subalterns to abuse their credulity in a way so gross as is shown by the documents published in this strange volume?

I need only state that it contains, as No. 5, a note to M. Stephan Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "On German public opinion as reported by diplomatic and consular agents," dated July 30, 1913, in which we read literally the following passage: "The personality of the Emperor is being discussed, the Chancellor is unpopular, but Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter was

the most hated man in Germany last winter. Though still in discredit, however, he is not hated so much, for he intimates that he will soon have his revenge." Now, in July, 1913, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter, the former Foreign Secretary, had been dead and buried for about half a year.

I wonder what salary France pays to her Ambassador and to her "diplomatic and consular agents" for furnishing her such first-class information on German politics.¹

This important document which, as is at once evident from its date, has nothing whatever to do with the present crisis, is contained in a kind

¹ We may, of course, look for another explanation of such an inadmissible blunder: What if the whole "document" had been compiled *ad hoc* from various reports, written at different periods? Let us suppose the man entrusted with its compilation had overlooked the contradiction between the facts contained and the date he chose to put on his performance. Still, if this be the case, what is the worth of proofs and documents prepared and dated in such a way? What is the worth of the whole publication?

of "Prelude," where, what one might call "German Impressions" are to be found, impressions which are calculated to produce in their turn a certain desirable impression upon the mind of the reader, and to imbue him with the idea that the German Government and the German nation thirsted for war long before the Servian Question arose at all.

It is preceded by another document, dated April 2, 1913, and printed as No. 2, an "official and secret report on the reinforcement of the German army" which M. Etienne, then French War Minister, sent to the Foreign Minister, M. Jonnart. Not a word is said on the not unimportant question: viz. for what German office this secret report had been destined or from what German office it had taken its origin. It is given as official with all the candour of innocence.¹

¹ One French paper, commenting on this document, stated that it had been found somewhere in Germany in a first-class railway compartment where a high German officer had forgotten it, other

To anybody who knows the dry, matter-of-fact style of German official documents it is clear at first sight that the whole article, in which we find phrases of the “gnashed teeth of French Chauvinists,” of the necessity of “extending German Power all over the world” and the like, must at best have been stolen from the editor’s office of some second-class Pan-Germanist Magazine, such as we often find ridiculed in “*Simplicissimus*.” It culminates in the sentence that Germany must reconquer the old County of Burgundy because some five hundred years ago it had been a fief of the old Empire, a political idea which is of the same order and about as serious as if a fanatical subject of the Austrian Emperor should write upon the necessity of reconquering the Kingdom of Jerusalem because

journals, that it had been destined for no less a person than the Emperor himself, though, maybe, it was only the rough draught of a speech the German Chancellor had intended to make!

the Austrian Emperor is titular king of it.

The only question is: Was the acquisition of this wonderful document a "sell" on the man who acquired it, or is the publication to be regarded as a "sell" on French readers who are willing, of course, to believe anything possible in Germany?

Unhappily the Ambassador and his staff are also quite incapable of discerning between facts and hearsays, or of judging the real significance of an event considered as a symptom of the state of Germany and German public opinion. The Frenchman, as ever, knows only France and French ways.

For instance, in a note addressed on March 15, 1913, by the naval attaché of the Embassy, M. de Faramond, to the Naval Minister, M. Baudin (Yellow Book No. 1, Annex II), a conversation between a member of the French Embassy and the Prince of Henckel-Donnersmarck is re-

ported in which the latter said among other things: "The French are quite wrong in believing that we have dark designs and wish for a war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 public opinion forced the French Government to attack us in a foolish manner without being prepared. Who is to assure us that French public opinion always so quick to flare up in excitement, will not some day oblige the Government of the Republic to make war on us? All we want is to be protected against this danger."

In No. 3 (Note by M. J. Cambon to M. Pichon of May 6, 1913, Yellow Book No. 3), M. Cambon has heard that in military circles the Chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, is reported to have said: "We must do away with all trivial phrases concerning the responsibility which will lie at the aggressor's door . . . on the day on which there will be nine chances to one that war is to break out, we have

to forestall our chief adversary, and to begin without further delay to tread down brutally all resistance." Being a German officer, accustomed to silence and duty, General von Moltke, even if he had entertained such a thought, would never have given expression to it; least of all in the way in which it is reproduced in this note. But if we go on perusing the French publication, we find that the reasonable and authentic words of Prince Donnersmarck are nothing to the French statesmen, while a tale which they admit to be only a hearsay, reported for all we know, by the fourth or fifth person, gives the bias to their whole thought.

Prince Henckel-Donnersmarck was mistaken only in so far as that, this time, it was not public opinion which forced the French Government, but the French Government which forced the public opinion of France, and is still trying to force it by such publications.

No. 6 of the "Prelude" contains similar utterances, ascribed to General von Moltke and to the Emperor, which they are reported to have made in a private conversation with the King of Belgium in November, 1913. M. Cambon's authority seems to be the King of Belgium himself or, what is more probable, some person to whom the King confided his impression. M. Cambon himself says only that he has his information from a "source absolutely sure." Now the German authorities have since stated in the "*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*" that such a conversation never took place, but that the King of Belgium who had, of course, conferred with the German Emperor, had had another and strictly private conversation with General von Moltke at which nobody else was present. We can but conclude that, passing through several brains and as many mouths, everything, the persons conversing as well as their utterances, underwent the changes

which are inevitable in such cases, until finally they reached the childish tenor which best suited M. Cambon's intentions.

We may open the pamphlet at random; everywhere we find sources of information of the same nature:—gossips, hearsays, conjectures, hypotheses, beliefs, suspicions.

In No. 14 (Consular note, dated from Vienna July 20, 1914), the intentions of the official Austrian Agency are suspected. In No. 16 M. Jules Cambon "has every reason to *believe* that Germany will not intervene at the court of Vienna." In No. 29, the same statesman wires that the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* "*is inclined to think*" that a great part of German public opinion is desirous of war. In No. 30 he *believes* the contrary of what Herr von Jagow tells him. In No. 55 M. Dumaine states his *impression* of what the Austrian Government will in future "*believe*." In No. 57, a note of Sir M. de Bunsen

(published in the British Blue Book as No. 95), in which he says that he is *unable to verify* a certain supposition, is quoted as a proof of the same supposition. In No. 102 M. Dumaine has "*the suspicion*" that Germany has caused Austria to attack Servia in order to be able herself to make war on Russia and France!

Distrust of all German acts and disbelief in all German assertions appear to be a main characteristic of French statesmanship. Now to a certain extent this might seem comprehensible, though it must be clear at once how difficult the establishment of sincere and peaceful relations between the two nations was thereby rendered. But both the distrust and the disbelief go to a length which is simply illogical. No reason or evidence, however conclusive, holds out against French prejudice.

It is in vain that Herr von Jagow and Herr von Schoen repeat over and over again (Yellow

Book No. 30, 41, 57) that they had not been informed beforehand of the contents of the Austrian ultimatum. The French statesmen will not believe it. But they are quite ready to believe that the Italian statesmen had not been informed of it. Yet Germany being bound to assist Austria against Russia under all circumstances, and Italy being bound to do so only if the measure taken had been preconcerted with her, it would have been much more important to Austrian statesmen to inform the Italian Cabinet of their intentions than to inform their German Colleagues. M. Cambon with all his intelligence did not see that the Austrian Government, in spite of its close and faithful alliance with Germany, had always jealously guarded its independence of German dictates in what it considered its own affairs.

I can but repeat what has been said on the question in the second part of this study. Aus-

trian politicians had no need to be goaded on in this matter. They, not the German Government, had felt for years the burning and irritating wound caused by Servian propaganda; their heir apparent had been murdered, not the German prince. It is quite possible and even probable that Austrian statesmen feared that the German Government as well as the Italian, both being very interested in the result, might try to exert a moderating influence on them, of which they would have been impatient. That this would in fact have been the case is rendered particularly probable by a conversation between Sir Horace Rumbold and Herr von Jagow which took place on July 25, and is reported in a note of the same day, published in the British Blue Book No. 18.

If it were worth while to examine the whole performance in detail, one could easily make a long article by merely pointing out inaccurate

statements and false suppositions. But we need only dwell on a few important passages.

I. The question discussed by us in our digression on the British Blue Book on p. 110-9 is treated in the following way in the French Yellow Book.

On July 29, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, states that the Austro-Hungarian Government refused the Russian Government's invitation for direct negotiations between the two Cabinets (Yell. B. No. 91); M. Dumaine wires from Vienna that Count Berchtold flatly refused the demand of M. Schebeko for particular powers to be given to Count Szápáry for that end (Yell. B. No. 94), and M. Paul Cambon in London has heard that Sir Edward Grey informed Prince Lichnowsky of Austria's refusal. (Yell. B. No. 96.) M. Sazonof himself telegraphs to his Ambassador in Paris

that the fact of Austria's having declared war on Servia makes a continuation of his conferences with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador impossible (Yell. B. No. 95).

In the meanwhile M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, has telegraphed from Berlin that the German Chancellor is intervening in favor of a continuation of these conferences (Yell. Book No. 92), and M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting French Foreign Minister, has received the same information from Herr von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris. (Yell. B. No. 94.) Consequent upon this M. Dumaine is in a position to telegraph from Vienna on the next day—July 30—that the conferences between Austria and Russia are to continue, the interruption being due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold having believed that the Austrian ultimatum itself, that is to say Austria's demands, should be discussed, to which he could by no

means consent. (Yell. B. No. 104.) On the following day—July 31—M. Viviani, the French Premier and Foreign Minister, informs his Ambassadors of M. Sazonof's "formula" which the French Government is ready to accept, and M. Paléologue informs him in turn of the alteration of the formula (Yell. Book No. 112 and 113).

So far everything is correct; but now the same mode of juggling sets in which we have observed in the Introduction to the British Blue Book and in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's letter. In a note of Aug. 1, the day after the German ultimatum,—this is very important to note—M. Viviani says that on the evening before the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count Szécsen, had informed him of the intention of his Government not to aspire to any territorial aggrandisement in Serbia, on condition that the conflict should be localised to Austria and Serbia only; and that

the Russian Government had been notified of the same. Yet in the same note M. Viviani pretends that in St. Petersburg M. Sazonof had been informed by Count Szápáry of Austrian readiness to discuss the ultimatum itself. You see, the Russian Minister went in his interpretation of Austria's offers just the one step further which is all important and which Austria was not willing to go. Had negotiations continued, he would probably have said, as Sir Edward Grey said on another memorable occasion, that he had "misunderstood" Count Szápáry or that he had been misunderstood himself; his pretension was simply a "*ballon d'essay*." But as further negotiations were cut short by the war, M. Viviani and Sir Maurice took up the "ball," because it enabled them to lay the blame on Germany. The way, however, in which this was done by the French Minister is so very strange that it has to be stated in detail here. For in

the introductory lines of that same note (Yell. B. No. 120) M. Viviani says that the Austrian Ambassadors had, on the previous day, made two conciliatory steps, one rather vague in Paris, and one very precise at St. Petersburg. Now, whoever reads M. Viviani's own note must see that just the opposite had been the case, that Count Szécsen had made in Paris a very precise statement; having said according to Viviani's own words, that "the Austro-Hungarian Government had no territorial ambition and would not touch the independence of the Servian State; that it had no intention to occupy the Sandjak; but that these same declarations of disinterestedness should be valid only in case of a localisation of the conflict, as a European war might bring eventualities which nobody was in a situation to foresee." M. Viviani adds that Count Szécsen commented upon this declaration and gave him to understand that "though his Gov-

ernment could not answer any questions put to it by the Powers in their own name, it could undoubtedly answer questions put by Servia herself or by another Power in Servia's name, and that there might be some hope in this." On the contrary, Count Szápáry is said to have declared to M. Sazonof "his Government's readiness to discuss the contents of the ultimatum"; nothing more!

How curious that M. Viviani should call this declaration which could not be more vague, a precise one, and Count Szécsen's declaration which could not be preciser a vague one?

In fact, Count Szécsen and Count Szápáry had both received exactly the same information from their Government, and had both stated exactly the same thing, one to M. Viviani and the other to M. Sazonof; yet as M. Sazonof had seen fit to misunderstand Count Szápáry, and to believe that Austria was willing to defer to a conference

of the Powers, M. Viviani saw fit to believe M. Sazónof and to disbelieve the explicit and official communication which the Austrian Ambassador had made to him in his Government's name, and in which a deference to the Powers was expressly excluded!

All this is curious, but what is more curious is that, in his next note, M. Viviani also goes one step further and says that he informed the German Ambassador of *his* having received communications from the *Austrian* Government declaring that it had no desire for aggrandisement in Servia, nor would it invade the Sandjak; and that *it was ready to discuss the whole question in London with the other Powers.*

Now here we have a direct falsehood; for never had M. Viviani received such a communication from the *Austrian* Government. Count Szécsen having declared only the first part of it, M. Viviani had heard from the Russian Govern-

ment—but not from Austria—that Austria had declared herself ready to discuss the Servian ultimatum. Now, this makes all the difference in the world! And not even Sazónof had dared to pretend that Austria was really willing to discuss in London with the Powers; he had only said that such was his own wish!

Owing to the publication of the Austrian Red Book which has appeared just as this little study is going to print, we are in a position to give the exact tenor of the information which Count Szápáry had received from his government:

In his telegram of July 30, 1914 (Red Book No. 49), Count Berchtold forwarded the following instruction: "Answer to Your Excellency's telegram of July 29: As before, I do, of course, not object to Your Excellency's explaining to M. Sazónof the various points of our note to Servia, though later events (viz. the Austrian declaration of war on Servia) have deprived it of actuality.

I should also particularly appreciate it if on this occasion—as M. Schebeko intimated—the questions directly concerning our relations to Russia would be discussed in a friendly and confidential manner. As a result of such a discussion, one may hope that incertainties and doubts which much to our regret exist, may be cleared, and the desirable peaceful development of further relations between the two neighbouring Empires be assured.”

In order to exclude all incertainty as to the meaning of this telegram, Count Berchtold wired a second time on the same day (Red Book No. 50):

“As I telegraphed to-day, Your Excellency is free to give to M. Sazónof all explanations desired concerning our note, though the outbreak of the war has deprived it of actuality. *Such explanations can, of course, be nothing more than a comment post factum, as it has never been*

our intention to yield on any point of our note. I have, moreover, empowered Your Excellency to discuss our special relations to Russia with M. Sazónof in a friendly way."

To this Count Szápáry gave answer in a telegram of Aug. 1, 1914 (Red Book No. 56): " . . . I told M. Sazónof that it was an error that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. I informed him that Your Excellency was not only ready to treat with Russia on the broadest basis but particularly to discuss the text of our note, *in so far as an interpretation* of the text should be desired. . . . On M. Sazónof's calling my attention to the fact that a discussion in St. Petersburg seemed for obvious reasons to give less hope of success than one in neutral London, I gave answer that Your Excellency intended, as I had told him before, direct communication with St. Petersburg, *that I was not in a position to make any utterance on his proposal of*

a discussion in London, but would report on it to Your Excellency."

The case is quite clear, and the mildest interpretation of the whole proceeding would be the following: All the Powers wished for direct conferences between Russia and Austria, which Austria refused because Russia desired them to go farther than Austria thought she could permit; upon Germany's intervention Austria consented, on the express condition that her demands as stated in the ultimatum should not be touched on. M. Sazónof, however, at once made the attempt to disregard the Austrian condition by trying to impose his formula on her; and he probably did this, because in Germany's intervention and in Count Pourtalès' earnest appeal on behalf of peace (see Brit. Blue Book No. 97), he believed he saw a sign of weakness on Germany's side. When he found out that he had deceived himself and failed to triumph in

this way, he simply bade his representatives state the untruth that Austria had been quite willing to do on the 31st, what she had flatly refused until then. And the British as well as the French statesmen seconded him in this, not only because they desired Russia's triumph, but because they desired still more to deceive the world concerning the fact, that Germany had seriously intervened in Vienna in the interests of peace; and because in what they well knew to be a Russian stratagem and an absolute untruth, they saw a further possibility to lay the blame on Germany.

We would fain believe that in the hurry and excitement of the hour such a misunderstanding had been possible, were not the methods adopted in these misunderstandings so curiously and so exactly alike in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's letter of Sept. 1, and in M. Viviani's note of August

1, which note—observe!—was not published until December, 1914.

There is, however, a piece of still more curious information to be found in the Yellow Book:

On page 127 we find printed as No. 115 a note from M. Dumaine to M. Viviani, dated Vienna, July 31, 1914, in which the Ambassador informs the Minister that “general mobilisation had been decreed by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the same day at one o’clock after midnight.” On page 129, follows as No. 118 a note by M. Paléologue from St. Petersburg, dated the same day, in which it is said, that “because of the general mobilisation in Austria and the secret measures taken in Germany, the order for general mobilisation of the Russian army had been issued.”

Now these two notes and their arrangement constitute a falsification of facts. Austrian statesmen for a long time and as late as July 29 gave expression to the hope that Russia would

not interfere (see British Blue Book No. 32 and 71). It is known to all the world that Austria mobilised against Servia only, until, by Russia's having mobilised against her during several days, she was finally forced to mobilise herself in Galicia on July 31 (see Red Book No. 53). This fact is confirmed by the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, in his note of July 25 (Blue Book No. 6), in which he reports on M. Sazonof's declaration that "if Austria proceeded to embark on military measures *against Servia*, Russian mobilisation would have to be carried out." It is confirmed by the Czar himself, who in his telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, which is reprinted in the Yellow Book on page 211, states that Russian military measures had been decreed five days ago, that is to say on July 25, as a measure of defence against Austria's preparations (against Servia, of course). Not a word is said of a general mobili-

sation having taken place in Austria in the telegram in which Sir G. Buchanan informed his Government of the Russian order. The British Ambassador says: "This decision has been taken in consequence of *report* received from Russian Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia." It is, therefore, clear that the text of the M. Paléologue's note has been changed and arranged for publication. By a rather poor trick the telegram announcing the Austrian general mobilisation has been printed before the telegram announcing the Russian one, though the two orders having been issued in the inverse order, the telegrams, necessarily, had likewise been sent in the inverse order. It is further a conscious falsehood when in his note of August 1, M. Viviani says or pretends to have said that "Austria first proceeded

to a general mobilisation." (Yellow Book No. 127.) All this is obviously done with the intention of freeing Russia from blame, and laying on Austria the responsibility of having broken the world's peace.

Now M. Viviani shows himself too solicitous a friend. In order to please England, he states that Austria on July 31 was ready to submit to Russia and to allow her demands to be discussed by a conference of the Powers, and that only the thunderbolt of the German ultimatum, despatched to Russia on the same day at noon, destroyed the hopes founded on Austria's peaceful dispositions. And in order to please Russia, he states in the same breath that while Russia showed an incontestable goodwill ("*montrait une bonne volonté incontestable*"), Austria, peaceful Austria, proceeded in the first hour of the very same day on which she is said to have yielded, first of all Powers, to a general mobilisation,

and this not after the German ultimatum but eleven hours before! For M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, states expressly in his telegram that the Austrian order for general mobilisation had been decreed at one o'clock in the morning of July 31. It is an old saying that he who proves too much does prove nothing at all.

For, if M. Dumaine in his telegram, Sir Maurice de Bunsen in his letter, Sir Edward Grey in his introduction, M. Viviani in his Yellow Book, and M. Sazónof in his notes have said the truth, Austria on the evening of the same day on which she had issued the order for general mobilisation against Russia declared herself ready to do all that Russia desired!

The lesson conveyed by these astonishing facts seems to be: If you see fit to make false statements, do not make two which are flatly contradictory to each other. For either Austria was the first to issue the order for general mobilisa-

tion on the morning of July 31, and then certainly her intentions on that day were far from peaceful, and Germany could not interrupt any negotiations between her and Russia; or Austria was peaceful, and then she cannot have been the first of all Powers to decree general mobilisation on July 31.

II. The French note which has been altered several times in the British Blue Book (see pp. 121-2 of this study) seems to have never been the genuine French note at all. We do not venture to decide whether the first alterations were made by the French Embassy in London on its own account or on the demand of the British Foreign Office. We do but state the fact.

The publication of the French Yellow Book affords evidence that the whole text of the French Foreign Minister's note has been changed. The original which is reprinted in the Yellow Book

as No. 106 on p. 120, is dated from July 30, and even these sentences which are contained in both versions are rendered in a different sequence. For the reader's convenience, both texts are reprinted here and put beside each other. The parts contained in both notes are printed in italics, the passage quoted on p. 122, which is added in the Blue Book while it is not to be found in the original note, is designated by quotation-marks.

Yellow Book No. 106.

M. René Viviani, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France à Londres.

Paris, le 30 juillet 1914.

Je vous prie de porter à la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignements suivants touchant les préparatifs militaires français et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra que si la France est résolue, ce n'est pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression.

Vous attirerez l'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur la décision prise par le Conseil des

Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure III.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

Paris, le 31 Juillet 1914.

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, Vendredi hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouverne-

Yellow Book No. 106—*Cont.*

Ministres de ce matin: bien que l'Allemagne ait pris ses dispositifs de couverture à quelques centaines de mètres de la frontière, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux Vosges, et porté ses troupes de couverture sur leurs positions de combat, *nous avons retenu nos troupes à 10 kilomètres de la frontière*, en leur interdisant de s'en rapprocher d'avantage.

Notre plan, conçu dans un esprit d'offensive, prévoyait pourtant que les positions de combat de nos troupes de couverture seraient aussi rapprochées que possible de la frontière. En livrant ainsi une bande du territoire sans défense à l'agression soudaine de l'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la République tient à montrer que la France, pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilité de l'attaque.

Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux côtés de notre frontière: en France, les permissionnaires n'ont été rappelés qu'après que nous avons acquis la certitude que l'Allemagne l'avait fait depuis cinq jours.

En Allemagne, non seulement les troupes en garnison à Metz ont été poussées jusqu'à la frontière, mais encore elles ont été renforcées par des éléments transportés en chemin de fer des garnisons de l'intérieur, telles que celles de Trèves ou de Cologne.

Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure III. *Continued*

ment britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. *Tout le 16^e Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8^e venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15^e Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation; or nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.*

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. "J'ajoute que "toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les "préparatifs allemands ont "commencé samedi, le jour "même de la remise de la note "autrichienne."

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un, et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

Yellow Book No. 106—*Cont.*

Rien d'analogue n'a été fait en France.

L'armement des places de la frontière (deboisements, mise en place de l'armement, construction de batteries, renforcement de réseaux de fil de fer) a été commencé en Allemagne dès le samedi 25; chez nous, il va l'être, la France ne pouvant plus se dispenser de prendre les mêmes mesures.

Les gares ont été occupées militairement en Allemagne le samedi 25, en France le mardi 28.

Enfin, en Allemagne, les réservistes, par dizaine de milliers, ont été rappelés par convocations individuelles, ceux résidant à l'étranger (classes de 1903 à 1911) rappelés, les officiers de réserve convoqués; à l'intérieur, les routes sont barrées, les automobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. *C'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation.* Aucune de ces mesures n'a été prise en France.

L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières; par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Tout le XVI^e Corps de Metz, renforcé par une partie du VIII^e venu de Trèves et de Cologne, occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg; le XV^e Corps d'armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière.

Sous menace d'être fusillés,

Yellow Book No. 106—*Cont.*
les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays
annexés ont défense de passer
la frontière.

René Viviani.

We offer no comments except the repeated question: What confidence can serious readers grant to official publications where the published documents appear to be arranged and altered at convenience?

As to the parts of the French publication which seem serious and genuine, they offer nothing new but contain only facts which are already known.

THE END

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


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